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DECISION-MAKERS' IMAGES: THEIR USE IN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS

by

© JANET WILKINSON BRONS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled DECISION-MAKERS' IMAGES: THEIR USE IN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS submitted by JANET WILKINSON BRONS in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of ARTS.

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ABSTRACT

The subject of the present work is the national image. Although national image is, as yet, a relatively unexplored concept, the author believes it to be of vital importance to the study of political decision-making.

It is generally agreed that it is the individual's perception of his environment that directly influences his behavior. It is not the reality, but the perception of that environment which affects the way in which he acts and reacts within his surroundings.

This general principle is as applicable to the decision-maker in the realm of foreign policy as it is to any individual. However, an important component of perceived environment of the foreign policy decision-maker is doubtlessly the image which he holds of those nations with which he must interact. The author believes that these national images play a vital role in the decisions that are reached and the actions that are taken by decision-makers. The implications of such images, then, are great.

This work is not only concerned with the importance of images; the author also believes it possible to in fact determine the content of national images. However, the study begins with a discussion of much of the research which has previously been conducted in the area. Images are also

considered in relation to the socio-psychological concept of perception, and consideration is given to matters such as image formation and the judgmental process.

The focal point of the work, however, is an attempt to actually ascertain the images which were held by one of the most powerful foreign policy decision-makers of our time, -- American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. The method utilized is the evaluative assertion analysis of statements made by Dulles about four states, -- the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Hungary and Egypt. The statements were those retrieved from the press conferences which Dulles held during his time in office. The actual method used and conclusions reached will be explored in some detail.

It is expected that this method will prove a valuable research tool to those interested in achieving a greater understanding of the decision-making process.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO IMAGES

It has been suggested that, "it is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior."[1] This simple statement expresses a basic truth about the behavior of individuals. It is our perception of reality, not reality itself that is of the greatest importance in affecting the way in which we behave. Our perception of the world in which we operate, our image of that world, affects how we act and react to a far greater extent than does that which we cautiously refer to as "objective reality". Our image of the world, however, is not one tidy, complete, consistent picture which we carry around with us. In fact, we cannot speak of one image at all, but instead, of a composite of images, -- images of objects, of persons, of events, of each of the various aspects of our environment. Images may be relatively simple or highly complex. They may be rigid, unchanging, or flexible and easily altered. They may be consistent or inconsistent with the other images that we hold. But whatever the content of our images, however they may have arisen, however "close" they may be to "reality", it is the images which we hold that affect our behavior.

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[1]Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 423.

Obviously, we can isolate many categories of images. In this paper we will be concerned with national images.[2] William A. Scott explains that,

> ...an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation.[3]

This definition is somewhat too broad for our present purposes, for we further restrict our discussion to those images which are held by foreign policy decision-makers. Decision-makers, no less than anyone else, "act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in response to reality itself."[4] K.J. Holsti contends that,

> In policy making, the state of the environment does not matter so much as what government officials believe that state to be. By images we mean an individual's perceptions of an object, fact, or condition, his evaluation of that object, fact, or condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value, and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced

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[2]The term "national image" is often used synonymously with terms such as "international image", "foreign image", or "foreign policy image". For the purposes of this paper the term "national image" will consistently be employed.

[3]William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images", in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 72.

[4]Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 3. This is particularly evident when the decision-maker is acting alone, or almost alone. When larger groups make decisions, the personality of each member becomes less important in reaching the final decision. For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of group decision-making, see Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972).

from that object, fact, or condition.[5]

It should be noted here that when we speak of the national image of a particular state held by a particular decision-maker, we are in effect discussing several things simultaneously. Kenneth Boulding discusses many aspects of the national image, including the geographical aspect, the historical aspect, the degree of friendliness or hostility exhibited by the state, and the degree of strength or weakness shown by that state.[6] Boulding also makes a salient distinction between the image held of the small group of powerful decision-makers in the nation being perceived, and that of the mass of people living in that state. This last distinction is important, for we must recognize that a decision-maker (or anyone else) may have an "image" of a state's administration which differs greatly from the image held of the state's residents in general. For example, a Canadian citizen may see the Soviet governmental elite as devious, untrustworthy, and ruthless, yet he may imagine the people themselves to be warm, honest, and in most respects much like himself.[7] Since a very large part of the national

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[5] K. J. Holsti, International Politics -- A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1972) p. 360.

[6] See Boulding, op. cit., pp. 424-426.

[7] John Foster Dulles himself was very much aware of the dichotomy between the Soviet elite and the Russian people. For further discussion of this distinction, see Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, Calif., 1962), pp. 98-102.

image is the type of "character" which a decision-maker ascribes to a particular state, we must clarify which of these two images will be of the most importance to the decision-maker. A foreign policy decision-maker necessarily deals with members of the decision-making elite of other states. These are the people with whom he talks, socializes, and negotiates. Their behavior and attitudes, when acting as representatives of their respective nations, will greatly influence how other decision-makers perceive their states. The ideology of the governing elite, their positions on international issues, and their past decisions will all affect the way in which they are regarded by other elites. In this sense the actions of the state are, in effect, the actions of the decision-making elite. This position was taken by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. They contend that,

> It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision-makers -- those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers.[8]

We will therefore assume that when a decision-maker makes a statement such as "Chinese are evil people" or "Kenyans can be trusted", he is referring to the character of the decision-making elite of China or of Kenya. Of course,

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[8]Ricard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 65.

this will not be the case if it is clear from the context in which a statement is made that the decision-maker is indeed referring to the residents of a nation as a whole. However, it is clear that, to the decision-maker, a state is characterized in terms of its leaders. This component of the national image, together with the other attitudes and information which the decision-maker has about the state, comprise his image of that nation.

We are convinced that the national images held by foreign policy decision-makers exert an influence on the decisions reached in the international arena. When we speak of national images, of the way in which individual decision-makers perceive other nations, we are moving into the realm of social psychology. In the study of national image, the dual fields of social psychology and political science can merge, and lead us to a better understanding of how and why political decisions may be reached. This understanding may well provide us with a clearer interpretation of the individual's past decisions, and hopefully, a clue about his future ones.

If it is indeed so important to understand the images held by decision-makers, how does one go about learning what these images are? The major purpose of this paper is to suggest a method for doing so. By employing the technique of content analysis, we will assess the images held by John Foster Dulles of four nations, -- the Soviet

Union, Hungary, Egypt and Great Britain.[9] The methodology which we will utilize in this study will provide a simple, yet accurate procedure through which to "get at" these types of images. However, we also wish to discuss some of the work which has already been done on national image, and to discuss image in terms of the social psychological concept of perception. Therefore, we will begin with a literature review (chapter two), emphasizing the number of different directions which research on national image has taken. Particular attention will be paid to the work done by Philip Burgess, Michael Brecher, and Ole Holsti. The chapter which follows (chapter three) will deal with the concept of perception itself. As is already evident, the "political" subject of national image is closely linked to the social psychological area of perception. In this chapter, we will rely heavily on material from the field of social psychology in order to increase our understanding of the psychological processes behind the political ones. Chapter four will deal with several topics of relevance to our own analysis of Dulles' images. A brief sketch of the Secretary of State will be presented, followed by the reasons why Dulles and the four nations under consideration have been selected for this study. We will then turn to a discussion of the sources available about a decision-maker, and their relative useful-

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[9]The reasons for which Dulles himself and these particular states have been chosen will be discussed in chapter four.

ness to a study such as this. A brief word about content analysis, and a statement of our methodology will follow. The results of the analysis will be presented in chapter five, and a summary and conclusions will complete the study.

CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

The following section is devoted to an overview of the literature in the social sciences dealing with national images. Researchers have taken many different directions in studying image, and these pages will provide the reader with an indication of the broad variety of works which are available. As a reminder, the focus of our own interest is on the way in which one key decision-maker in the realm of foreign policy views the other states with which he interacts.

A major problem which one encounters in doing any research in this area is the wide range of topics that can actually be covered by the term "national image". In examining the various catalogues and indices available it is evident that materials dealing with national images have in many cases been incorporated into work done in other areas, such as stereotypes, prejudice, and national character. While these are clearly related areas, they are somewhat removed from our field of interest. It is obvious that the study of national image, as it relates to the perception of the individual decision-maker, is an emerging area of inquiry. The area of political psychology itself is a relatively young field, and little research has been undertaken in order to ascertain the images held by decision-makers and to postulate the types of effects which such images may have upon decision-making.

Perhaps the best place to begin our discussion of the literature is with Kenneth E. Boulding. Boulding, an economist, offers us much in the way of a theoretical grounding in images. His book The Image and later article, "National Images and International Systems" are notable contributions to the area.[1] In the earlier work, the author uses the term "image" in its broadest sense and includes the role of images not only in the political arena, but also in such areas as economics, society, and knowledge.[2] Boulding's later paper, however, deals more specifically with "national" images. The national image includes many dimensions, -- the territorial and historical dimensions, as well as the perceived hostility or friendliness and strength or weakness of a state. This image, however, can be dangerous, for it is,

> ...basically a lie, or at least a perspective distortion of the truth, which perhaps accounts for the ease with which it can be perverted to justify monstrous cruelties and wickedness. There is much that is noble in the national image. It has lifted man out of the narrow cage of self-centeredness, or even family-centeredness, and has forced him to accept responsibility, in some sense, for people and events far beyond his face-to-face cognizance and immediate experience. Nevertheless, it achieves those virtues usually only at the cost

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[1] See Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan, 1956) and Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

[2] The term "image" in the broad sense seems to be the same as Ole Holsti's "belief system" and Michael Brecher's "view of the world". For a more precise definition of terms, see Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), footnote #2, pp. 524-525.

> of untruth, and this fatal flaw constantly betrays it. Love of country is perverted into hatred of the foreigner, and peace, order, and justice at home are paid for by war, cruelty, and injustice abroad.[3]

Be it enobling or "perverted into hatred", we must agree with Boulding that "it is always the image, not the truth, that immediately determines behavior."[4]

Another manner in which the study of national image has been approached is from a socio-cultural viewpoint. One study typifying this approach is Robert A. LeVine's "Socialization, Social Structure and Intersocietal Images".[5] LeVine, an anthropologist, focusses upon preindustrial societies and examines the ways in which children form images of other groups. He also looks at the relationship between the internal social structure of a group and its intersocietal images, and behavior. In his work, LeVine discusses these aspects of images by using examples of various primitive communities, including the Bedouin Arabs, and the Gusii of Kenya.

One area in which a great deal of research has been done deals with those images which are held by the masses of people residing in particular states. In fact, Philip Burgess

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[3]Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", op. cit., p. 424.

[4]Ibid., p. 423.

[5]Robert LeVine, "Socialization, Social Structure, and Intersocietal Images", in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 45-69.

points out that,

> ...most studies deal with the images of attentive or expressive publics and not with authoritative decision-makers. One reason for this, undoubtedly, is the increase of data made available by improved survey methods; also, analysts take added comforts in working with samples of larger, less ephemeral populations.[6]

An example of this type of study is the research conducted by Ithiel de Sola Pool, who has examined the effects of cross-national contact (i.e. travel) on peoples' images of other states.[7] Don D. Smith has studied the relationship between mass communication and the corresponding changes in images.[8] Another study has dealt with the perceptions of Soviet citizens both of themselves and of the United States.[9] American public opinion in relation to the Cold War has been examined by Milton J. Rosenberg.[10]

A comprehensive study of the perception of nations by nations is the oft-cited work by William Buchanan and

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[6]Philip Burgess, Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes -- A Study of Norway (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968), p. 8.

[7]Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Effects of Cross-National Contact on National and International Images", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., pp. 104-129.

[8]Don D. Smith, "Mass Communications and International Image Change", Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (March, 1973): 115-129.

[9]Ralph K. White, "Images in the Context of International Conflict -- Soviet Perceptions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., pp. 238-276.

[10]Milton J. Rosenberg, "Images in Relation to the Policy Process -- American Public Opinion on Cold-War Issues", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., pp. 278-334.

Hadley Cantril entitled How Nations See Each Other.[11] This study, conducted under the auspices of UNESCO, relates the results of an extensive public opinion survey conducted in nine nations. The researchers administered questionnaires to approximately one-thousand individuals in each of the nations selected, -- these being, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Mexico, and the United States. Each questionnaire consisted of fourteen questions, designed to ascertain

> (1)...how respondents in one country react to people in another, and (2) (to) reveal causative factors behind their reaction, so far as this tool of research permits.[12]

The massive amount of data which was gathered was then analysed in order to determine both the similarities and the differences between the responses of these nations. The study is basically descriptive in nature, and is indeed an intriguing piece of work. However, insofar as it is a classic example of the public opinion approach to national image, it is not relevant to our own endeavor.

The question of national image is approached from yet another perspective by William Welch. In researching American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy,[13] Welch has examined

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[11]William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953).

[12]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[13]See William Welch, American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy -- An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

each of twenty-two books dealing with Soviet "external conduct"[14] and rated them according to the image of the Soviet Union presented in each book. These books were, according to the author, representative of American images during the decade from 1955 to 1965. The books are classified on the basis of two continua: the first consists of what Welch describes as the "hardness" or "softness" of Soviet external conduct as portrayed by the authors, and the second rates the consistency of that conduct over a period of time (described as little, moderately, and significantly changing).[15] The continuum for "hardness" of external conduct was further sub-divided into categories such as Militancy and Turpitude (immorality). All statements in each of the works selected were rated according to their positions on the two continua, assigned numerical values, and ultimately classified as ranging from Ultra-Soft to Ultra-Hard, and from little to significantly changing. The numerical values of all images contained in a particular book were averaged, with a particular image of Soviet foreign conduct emerging from each.[16] Welch found that each of the twenty-two works fell into three distinct categories -- those portraying the Soviet Union as the "Great Beast", those viewing it as the "Neurotic Bear", and those describing it as the "Mellowing Tiger". The author

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[14]Ibid., p. 3.

[15]Ibid., p. 38.

[16]For a detailed methodological statement see Ibid., pp. 37-51.

makes an appeal to the academic community to be more systematic, more scientific, and less biased in its treatment of Soviet external conduct in the future. Although the work is interesting, it, too, falls outside the scope of the images with which we are concerned.

Representative of the class of literature dealing with national character is the work done by Washington Platt.[17] In National Character in Action, Platt suggests that states do possess particular character traits, and explains that it is as essential for individuals involved in foreign policy decision-making to,

> ...understand the character of the nation with which one is dealing as it is to understand the character of an individual in personal dealings.[18]

Platt begins his work with a lengthy discussion of the connection between personal character, group character, and national character. Addressing himself to both the academic and governmental communities, the author proceeds to examine the sources of information available to the student of national character. Also discussed are some of the criticisms levelled at the use of national character analysis as an intelligence tool; the types of investigation which must be conducted in order to develop an accurate assessment of a state's character are then analysed.

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[17] See Washington Platt, National Character in Action -- Intelligence Factors in Foreign Relations (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961).

[18] Ibid., p. vii.

Despite the interesting approach taken by Platt, it is of no real consequence to us whether or not nations do, in fact, exhibit particular characters. It is the perception of that state, the image of that nation which is in the mind of the decision-maker that does concern us. As an exaggerated example of this difference, consider the following. The state of Crestavia may exhibit qualities of paranoia, insecurity, and submissiveness. However, if a Canadian foreign policy decision-maker perceives (either through his personal predisposition or through faulty intelligence) that Crestavia is confident, untrustworthy, and threatening, it is upon these latter suppositions that he will act. While admittedly unlikely, our example does serve to illustrate the point that it is often perception, not "objective reality", that influences behavior. While Platt may help us to improve our intelligence systems by understanding national character, we must remember that individual perception is yet another matter.

Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt have studied the effects of events on pre-existing images.[19] In this context, these authors, too, deal with "mass" images. Deutsch and Merritt speak of governments as being producers and managers of the messages received by the public, and ultimately of the images held by the people. In some cases,

> ...public messages, reinforced by popular consent,

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[19]Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., pp. 132-187.

> generated such overwhelming expectations of conformity as to isolate and stigmatize at once anyone who uttered deviant views. Rather than hold such deviant opinions even privately, many individuals soon came to internalize many of the images and beliefs demanded by the community and its rulers.[20]

The research undertaken by these two authors was very comprehensive, and involved work that was both statistical in nature, and theoretical in orientation. Much of the research was based upon public opinion polls and survey research; several case studies were also utilized. The two types of research were subsequently combined in order to reach some conclusions regarding the effects of events on images. This topic is indeed germane to the present study, and will be dealt with in greater depth in the following chapter.

Irving Janis and Brewster Smith also deal with the concept of decision-makers imposing their images on the public.[21] By examining much of the research done and hypotheses generated in this area, they combine a great amount of information within this article. In "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images",[22] they not

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[20]Ibid., p. 138.

[21]Boulding, however, does not accept the view that images are imposed on the people; he feels instead that the powerful and the masses share the same images due to sharing similar societal and familial upbringings. For a further discussion see Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", op. cit., p. 424.

[22]Irving L. Janis and M. Brewster Smith, "Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., pp. 188-235.

only deal with the imposition of images from above, but point out that such images may also be directed at the population of another state.

Another approach to the study of national image is taken by Robert Jervis.[23] Jervis proceeds from the assumption that

> ...the decision-maker's image of a specific other actor is almost always an important component of (his) environment.[24]

However, the author does not deal with the way in which one can ascertain what these images are; instead, he examines several methods by which states can project desired images to other members of the international community. Jervis describes these methods of image projection, -- among them signals, indices, and lies, -- and provides examples of their use in international affairs. The author sees the skilful manipulation of one's image as another tool (in addition to traditional military, diplomatic, and economic techniques) by which a state may achieve its desired goals.

A psychological perspective is taken by William A. Scott in "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images".[25] Scott deals with information that is both of

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[23]Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 5.

[24]Ibid., p. 5.

[25]William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., pp. 70-103.

theoretical and empirical nature; the theoretical aspect of his work deals more specifically with psychological processes, while the empirical aspect involves the utilization of international attitude and public opinion studies. Scott produces several correlations between the images held by individuals, and their personalities in general; some of these are outlined in the following chapter of this work.

An approach which more closely approximates our own research concerns itself with the images held by decision-making elites. Elites, rather than individuals, may be the key to foreign policy decisions in many cases. Only in some instances will one individual wield enough power to clearly affect such decisions. In other cases, decisions are made by groups and it is the composite image of the elite which will be the important one.

Michael Brecher has studied intensively the role of images in the making of foreign policy decision. Brecher is convinced that

> ...one viable and researchable key to prediction of future behavior is analysis in depth of the images held by foreign policy elites.[26]

Therefore,

> (t)he task of the foreign policy analyst is to construct from words and deeds the operative elite perceptions of their environment, along with the views of the desirable or proper role for their

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[26]Michael Brecher, Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices -- Krishna Menon's View of the World (pamphlet) (Montreal: Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, 1967), p. 91.

state within that environment.[27]

Brecher has conducted extensive research on the images held by the elites of both Israel and India.[28] Elites, however, are composed of individuals, and the influence of key decision-makers on foreign policy is extremely important to the author. Evidence of this is his study of Krishna Menon, Indian nationalist and politician. In India and World Politics, -- Krishna Menon's View of the World,[29] Brecher has transcribed tape-recorded interviews which he held with Menon over many months. From these dialogues, which deal mostly with international politics, Brecher derived an accurate picture of the way in which Menon perceived the world in which he functioned. He proceeded to relate this "view of the world" to the kinds of foreign policy decisions which were reached while Menon was influential in the governing elite. Employing both a conscientious deductive analysis and a more scientifically precise content analysis, Brecher produced an insightful piece of research examining the relationship

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[27]Ibid., pp. 62-63.

[28]See, for instance, Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel -- Setting, Images, Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) or Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) or India and World Politics -- Krishna Menon's View of the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) or Political Leadership in India -- An Analysis of Elite Attitudes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969).

[29]Michael Brecher, India and World Politics -- Krishna Menon's View of the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

between elite attitudes and foreign policy decisions.

Michael Brecher has also employed a different method in order to determine elite images and attitudes. In the late 1960's, Brecher utilized a questionnaire in order to ascertain the attitudes of the Indian elite with regard to three issue areas: the "Causes and Results of the Congress Setback in the Fourth General Election" (1967), "Qualities of Leadership and the Ranking of Congress Leaders", and "The Succession Contest of 1967".[30] By means of a structured questionnaire administered to members of three prominant sectors of the Indian elite (eighty politicians, academics, and journalists or "opinion leaders") Brecher was able to discern the way in which these elites perceived the issue areas under consideration. In the book Political Leadership in India -- An Analysis of Elite Attitudes, the author categorized and analysed the responses obtained from the members of the elites for each of the questions. This study demonstrates another method through which elite attitudes and images may be discovered.

In researching the decision-making process, Brecher has developed a comprehensive Research Design, encompassing all of the variables which he feels pertinent to foreign policy decision-making. Included within this framework are the elite images of the internal and external environments.

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[30] See Michael Brecher, Political Leadership in India -- An Analysis of Elite Attitudes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), pp. 4-5.

Brecher, then, is not concerned only with national images, but with other images as well. For example, the elite images of the international system as a whole, of the regional system of which the "home" state is a part, and the image of the role to be played by that state, are all taken into consideration. Following is a schematic representation of Brecher's Research Design.

I INPUTS

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (E_o)

External
- Global (G)
- Subordinate Own (S_1)
- Subordinate Other (S_2)
- Dominant Bilateral (DB)
- Bilateral (B)

Internal
- Economic Capability (E)
- Military Capacity (M)
- Political Structure (PS)
- Competing Elites (CE)
- Interest Groups (IG)

Elite Images - of the operational environment and of the competing elites' images of the operational environment, as well as the pressure potential of competing elites and pressure groups.

II PROCESS

Formulation - of strategic and tactical decisions in four Issue-Areas:

Military Security (MS)

Political-Diplomatic (P-D)

Economic-Development (E-D)

Cultural-Status (C-S)

includes authorization or legitimizing of decisions.

Implementation - of decisions by various structures:

Head of State

Head of Government

Foreign Office, Etc.

III OUTPUTS - the substance of acts or decisions flowing from the implementation function.



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31For a complete discussion of Brecher's Research Design, see Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 1-8.

In two comprehensive complementary volumes, Brecher employs his Research Design in order to increase the understanding of Israel's foreign policy process. In The Foreign Policy System of Israel (1972),[32] the author examined,

> ...all components of the environment for decision, the changing composition of the decision-making elite, their attitudes and perceptions, and the formulation and implementation of policy choices and acts of a new Middle East state -- for a period of two decades as a whole.[33]

The succeeding volume, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, employs the Design in order to better the understanding of each of seven case studies. These include the Sinai Campaign, 1956, the Six-Day War, 1967, the Rogers Proposals, 1970, the Korean War and China, 1950-55, the German Reparations, 1950-52, the Jordan Waters, 1953-55, and Jerusalem, 1949 and 1967. In this work, Brecher explains that a part of his task in analysing Israel's decisions was to uncover the "relevant psychological environment" in which the decisions were made. To this end, the author employed two techniques:

> (a) qualitative analysis of an array of documents and (b) quantitative analysis of the content of speeches, statements, letters, diary entries, etc. during a period of days, weeks, or at most, a few months preceding the decision.[34]

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[32]Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel -- Setting, Images, Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

[33]Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. vii.

[34]Ibid., p. 5.

Also, three of the decisions were,

> subjected to frequency count and advocacy analysis, with the purpose of producing a scale of importance of environmental components in the image of each decision-maker. The results are collated and compared, facilitating an assessment of the linkage between image-advocacy data and decisions.[35]

Although Brecher's research and conclusions are far too complex to be summarized and discussed within a few short paragraphs, we must recognize the great contribution that he has made to the study of elite images. He says that the image held by the decision-maker,

> ...may be partial or general; it may be subconscious or consciously stated; it may be based on carefully thought-out assumptions about the world and his own state, or it may flow from instinctive perceptions and judgments. In any event, all decision-makers may be said to possess a set of images and to be governed by them in their response to foreign policy problems. Indeed, elite images are no less "real" than the reality of their environment and are much more relevant to an analysis of the foreign policy flow.[36]

In a remarkable piece of work,[37] David J. Singer has employed content analysis in order to gain a clearer understanding of the American and Soviet foreign policy operational codes (that is, the "assumptions, expectations, and perferences"[38] of each state) during the period from

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[35]Ibid.

[36]Michael Brecher, Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices -- Krishna Menon's View of the World, op. cit., p. 62.

[37]J. David Singer, "Content Analysis of Elite Articulations", Journal of Conflict Resolution 8 (December, 1964): 424-485.

[38]Ibid., p. 425.

May 1, 1957 to April 30, 1960. Singer contends that,

> ...here are two major powers...engaged in a very risky set of relationships and...the more objective and accurate a picture each has of the other's operational code, the less risky the relationships become.[39]

The content analysis was performed on three periodicals from both the United States and the Soviet Union. The American periodicals selected were the New York Times, the Department of State Bulletin, and Foreign Affairs; the Soviet sources employed were Pravda, Kommunist, and International Affairs. Articles and speeches from each periodical were analysed in order to ascertain from each state its:

1) image of the international environment,

2) evaluation of the power balance,

3) evaluation of the other state's operational code,

4) own operational code.

Each of these four categories was sub-divided into more precise dimensions, and the articles and speeches were coded accordingly.[40] Subsequently, a comparison was made between each state's perception of the other. Not surprisingly, each of the nations were found to hold strongly negative views about the other state. Singer, too, is dealing with the images and evaluations of foreign policy elites, and this work is a prime example of the use of content analysis in

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[39]Ibid., p. 426.

[40]While a detailed description of the highly complex analysis conducted by Singer will not be presented here, the reader is directed to pp. 425-435 of Singer's work for a complete methodological statement.

studying images. A replication of Singer's work today could provide some interesting comparisons.

Stephen A. Garrett also has examined the influence of images on the American decision-making elite.[41] Dealing with the time period from 1945 to 1948, Garrett discusses the way in which American decision-makers viewed the international scene in general, and the Eastern European scene in particular, directly after the Second World War. Garrett also looked at the image held by the elite of American public opinion. Employing an historical, as opposed to statistical, approach, and providing much insight through his knowledge of image and decision-making, this author gives us a fresh perspective on the origins of the Cold War.

Philip Burgess, in a comprehensive study of Norway, dealt with the images held by two authoritative decision-makers, and the effects that these images had on foreign policy choices.[42] Burgess examined what he calls the "strategic images" held by two Norwegian Foreign Ministers, Trygve Lie and Halvard Lange, during the period from 1940 to 1949. To the author, the strategic image summarizes "the way in which a policy-maker organizes, structures, evaluates and relates to his environment." The image also "has a selecting function, filtering the many bits of information that are

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[41] Stephen A. Garrett, "Images and Foreign Policy: The United States, Eastern Europe, and the Beginnings of the Cold War", World Affairs 138 (Spring, 1976):288-308.

[42] See Philip M. Burgess, Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes -- A Study of Norway (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968).

continually emitted by the environment."[43] This concept of image is not limited to one particular aspect of the environment, but encompasses a wide range of factors, including images of other nations, of Norway herself and of the international environment.

Burgess feels strongly that the study of images has not received the attention which it deserves from the academic community. One of the reasons that he feels this to be a worthwhile area of study is that he believes that there is considerable scope for prediction in the study of images.

> ...(I)f the image structure and content can be correctly defined, the range of relevant choices available to decision-makers can be reduced considerably. In short, given a certain range of alternatives, knowledge of the decision-maker's strategic image permits the projection of probable outcomes.[44]

Employing a careful historical approach, Burgess analysed in depth the situation in Norway and the images held by Foreign Ministers Lie and Lange. The data which he used to ascertain the content of these images was primarily selected from the major public statements made by the ministers between 1940 and 1949. According to the author, a "'major statement' is defined as a statement to the parliament...(and) a 'major' speech as defined by, and reflected

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[43]Ibid., p. 6.

[44]Ibid., p. 160.

in, the press."[45] Burgess utilized only the portions of such statements which reflected the images held by his subjects. Following this, the author sought correlations between the strategic images held and the types of foreign policy decisions actually made. Burgess argues that prior to 1940, Norway saw the international environment as composed both of powerful states, and of those exercising little power. The powerful nations were the prime movers, and most important interactions took place among them. Norway was not seen by her decision-makers to be of strategic importance; they believed, too, that the principles of international law would guarantee her neutrality should a war occur. These decision-makers, therefore, were convinced that in order to ensure her neutrality, Norway must refrain from making commitments to the more powerful states. The invasion of Norway in April of 1940 virtually disproved this assessment. This totally unexpected action provoked a major upheaval in the way in which Norway perceived herself, and prompted the foreign policy elite to view the state not as peripheral, but as strategically located. Moreover, it led the decision-makers to realize that in order to defend Norway from future aggression, they must in fact actively collaborate with the greater states to promote the cause of peace. This concept of collaboration was to supplant the

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[45]Ibid., p. 5.

previously existing notion that proclaiming one's neutrality would ensure safety. One ramification of this revised image was that Norway became more regionally and universally-oriented than she had been in the past. Burgess describes in some detail the evolution of Norwegian thinking about her place on the international stage in general, and with regard to alliance systems in particular. While Burgess's work does not deal with the genesis of the images from a psychological standpoint, it certainly demonstrates the implications of such images for foreign policy decision-making, and shows us one method by which the content of images can be ascertained.

One scholar who has done a great deal of work with regard to the national images held by decision-makers is Ole Holsti. His doctoral dissertation dealt with John Foster Dulles' images of the Soviet Union, and, as such, is of great relevance to the present study.[46] In his dissertation Holsti employed content analysis, -- more specifically, evaluative assertion analysis, -- to get at image data. Holsti analysed hundreds of statements drawn from numerous sources; among them were addresses, speeches, interviews, news conferences, and statements. In executing his research, Holsti employed the method first set out by Osgood, Saporta,

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[46] Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, Calif., 1962).

and Nunnally,[47] which basically involves the assigning of numerical values to assertions regarding a particular "attitude object", -- in this case, the Soviet Union. The author limited his analysis to,

> ...Dulles' assertions concerning the Soviet Union in the following categories: the hostility of its foreign policy; capabilities; success in its foreign policy; the degree of internal liberalization; and a general evaluation.[48]

Evaluative assertion analysis is also to be employed in the present study; this methodology will be elaborated upon in the fourth chapter.

Ole Holsti has also devoted much energy to understanding the cognitive processes which sustain national images, particularly the images of nations perceived as "enemies" by the decision-maker.[49] By dealing once again with John Foster Dulles, the author hypothesizes "...that there exist cognitive processes that tend to sustain such images (images of the enemy)."[50] Holsti content analyses Dulles' words to test this proposition. Some of the insights

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[47]C.E. Osgood, Sol Saporta and Jum C. Nunnally, "Evaluative Assertion Analysis". Litera III (1956):47-102. For a description of how this method was modified, see Holsti, op. cit., pp. 244-251.

[48]Holsti, op. cit., p. 244.

[49]See for instance, Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy", Journal of International Affairs 21 (January, 1967):16-39 or David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967).

[50]Ibid., p. 17.

with which Holsti's extensive research has provided us will be dealt with further on in this paper.

This concludes the chapter dealing with the literature available in the social sciences which focusses on national images.[51] It is evident that the research undertaken thus far has assumed many forms and taken many different directions. We have seen that students of numerous disciplines besides political science have become interested in national images, and that economists, sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists have all contributed to this field. Public opinion studies, psychological data, content analyses, historical approaches, anthropological studies, and decision-making theories have all been applied to the general study of images. While it has not been our intention to examine in depth everything ever written on national images, we have demonstrated the scope and variety of the work done in this area. We have also indicated some of the important works dealing not only with the area of particular interest to us, but those related to it as well.

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[51] Several of the works cited in this section were selected from Herbert C. Kelman's International Behavior (op. cit.). One-half of this book is devoted to national and international images, and contains much that is useful to the student of images.

CHAPTER III

PERCEPTION AND THE IMAGE

The formation of national images is not a political process, but a psychological one. The effects of such images, however, may have broad political implications. The way in which decision-makers perceive and judge other nations is a process which is closely related to the way in which individuals perceive and judge other objects or people. The present chapter will deal with perception, judgment, and the psychology of national images.

As individuals, we are constantly responding to the stimuli present in our environment. We observe the objects and people around us, we recognize and adjust to changing conditions, and we interact with other people. If we remained unaware of the stimuli present in our environment and did not react to it, we would not be fully functioning as human beings. We become aware of this stimuli by means of our senses; it is through our senses that our brains become aware of the objects, people, events and relationships present in our world. In other words, we perceive the myriad things around us, and it is these perceptions which allow us to make sense of the environment. Perception, then, involves interpretation, -- interpretation of environmental messages into meaningful information. Therefore, perception is not a single, isolated action; it is instead an ongoing process. It is not a passive process, either; perception is extremely active in nature.

> It is clear that in some sense perception involves an interaction or transaction between an individual and his environment; he receives information from the external world which in some way modifies his experience and behavior.[1]

Stimuli may be received by any of our senses, but, for the majority of us, visual perception is the manner through which we receive most environmental messages. The mechanics of visual perception itself are illustrated in the following passage, which employs a vase as the perceived object.

> Light waves of a certain wavelength are reflected off the vase. Some of them impinge on the retina of your eye, and if enough retinal cells are irritated, some visual nerves will fire and a series of electrical impulses will be carried through the sensory apparatus including the subcortical centers, and will finally arrive at the cortex.[2]

However, often we do not only see a vase, but instead a glass vase or a blue vase. We may go even further, and perceive the vase as pretty or valuable. So obviously the mechanics of vision are only the beginning of the perceptual process. At this point, the brain must interpret the visual message which it has received, and render it meaningful for the individual.

For Albert Hastorf, David Schneider, and Judith Polefka, the individual's perceptions, or "experiences of the

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[1]Peter B. Warr and Christopher Knapper, The Perception of People and Events (London: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1968), p. 2.

[2]Albert H. Hastorf, David J. Schneider, and Judith Polefka, Person Perception (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970), p. 4.

world", must have structure, stability, and meaning.[3] Without these features, the individual would receive only random, incoherent messages from the environment. In order to interpret these messages as structured, stable, and meaningful, the brain must perform certain functions.[4] These functions are, for the most part, subconscious and very rapid. First, people tend to be highly selective about what they perceive in that certain messages about the environment are accepted, and others rejected. Certain events are stored in our memories; others are simply forgotten. We also tend to categorize objects and people, and by relating them to other members of a group having similar characteristics, are better able to understand the object or person. Perceptions are not treated by the individual as isolated from one another, but are instead related to each other by the individual. This renders the new information more meaningful. People also like their perceptions to be consistent with one another. Therefore, if a message is received which conflicts with a previously-held perception, the new information may be disregarded completely. More will be said of this aspect of perception later in the chapter. According to Hastorf, Schneider and Polefka, the perceiver "...selects and categorizes, he interprets and infers to achieve a meaningful world

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[3]Ibid., pp. 3-10.

[4]For a detailed discussion of these processes see Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka, op. cit., chapter one.

in which he can act."[5] The exact way in which the brain performs these various functions is not known, but the mechanics of this process are not essential to our understanding of perception at this point. What we must recognize is that the perceptual process is highly complex, and involves a great deal more than simply "seeing" something or someone.

Other factors affecting the way in which we perceive are our past experiences and our present motivations.[6] Obviously, the way in which we view the world is in large part shaped by the experiences which we have had in the past. On the simplest level, a man who was bitten by a dog when he was a child will probably perceive dogs as much more frightening than will a man who has been brought up around friendly, lovable dogs. Motivation also influences our perceptions to some extent. One's perception of an individual who is trying to get one's job may be that the man is underhanded, aggressive, and untrustworthy. Yet his perception of the same man, should the two become friends, may be that he is intelligent, assertive, and determined. Clearly, one's motivation will affect one's perception.

There are two other facets of perception which we will note here, but which will not be dealt with until later in the chapter. Firstly, there is the question of the relationship between the perception of objects and the per-

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[5]Ibid., p. 17.

[6]Ibid., p. 9.

ception of people. Secondly, there is the very close relationship between the processes of perception and of judgment. This overview of the process of perception will provide us with a base upon which we can ground the ensuing discussion of the psychology of national images.

A national image may be thought of as a composite of many perceptions. Indeed, a national image is nothing but a general impression of a state that is based upon the individual's perceptions of that state. The image itself is composed of various types of perceptions, -- perceptions of the state's economy, political system, social structure, geographical area, the character of the ruling elite, the citizens in general, and so on. However, the image that is formed of a state is one general, complete impression. In Scott's words, the national image tends to be over-simplified.

> Any image of a nation is necessarily over-simplified. The nation itself includes various types of people and displays diverse behaviors in the international arena, yet the image that any person holds of it is marked by a relative coherence and consistency.[7]

Ole Holsti agrees that images are prone to over-simplification.

> All images are stereotyped in the trivial sense that they over-simplify reality. It is this characteristic that makes images functional -- and can render them dysfunctional.[8]

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[7]William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images", in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 80.

[8]Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy", Journal of International Affairs 21 (January, 1967): 16-39.

It is evident, then, that images are composed of many perceptions, but that the image itself tends to be oversimplified. However, despite the fact that different perceptions combine to produce an image, we are nonetheless convinced that decision-makers are often likely to identify the nation with that nation's decision-making elite, and vice versa. For example, while a state may be described as "large" or "productive", it may also be characterized as "hostile" or "powerful". The latter two terms are likely to be indicative of the nature of the decision-making elite, while the former two are merely objective descriptions of the nation. We also reaffirm our earlier contention that, unless otherwise stated or inferred from context, statements regarding "the British" or "the Egyptians" refer to the decision-makers in those countries.[9]

Due to the fact that images tend toward over-simplification and stereotyping, it is often all too easy to separate nations into categories such as good and bad, attractive and unattractive, friendly and unfriendly. It was noted earlier that categorizing is an important feature of perception. We can see, too, how closely the act of perceiving, and hence the formation of images, are related to the process of making judgments. In other words, instead of simply perceiving the objective facts about a nation, individ-

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[9]The same, of course, holds true when a decision-maker states that "Cairo is becoming impatient" or "the Kremlin is getting worried".

uals also often attribute certain qualities and motivations to that nation. In the language of the social psychologist, the role of the perceiver "...is an active role that contributes meaning to the perceptual result."[10]

How are judgments made? Mark Cook explains that the most feasible body of theory regarding the formation of judgments comes from the "inference theorists".[11] The inference theorists claim that judgments are formed by examining the information available about the perceived item, comparing it to what one knows about human behavior in general and inferring from this behavior a judgment. Of course, this is not always a conscious process.

It is also suggested that individuals have certain "rules" by which they form judgments about others.[12] Examples of such rules are, "People who are intelligent are well-adjusted", and "People who interrupt one are rude". The first rule is called an association rule in that two characteristics (being highly intelligent and being well-adjusted) are linked. The second is called an identification rule because it explains how one can identify a person (a person who is rude) by a certain characteristic (interrupting others). Even at the simplest level it is easy to see how many combinations of such rules we may adhere to without

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[10]Kelly G. Shaver, An Introduction to Attribution Processes (Englewood Cliffs: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.,1975), p. 21.

[11]Mark Cook, Interpersonal Perception (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), pp. 28-34.

[12]Ibid., pp. 33-36.

necessarily being aware that we are doing so. These types of rules may provide inferences from which the individual forms a judgment.

Cook also maintains that, "...there is no sound reason for supposing that the perception of people and of objects differs in any important respect."[13] Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka also feel that the two processes are very similar, but also point out that there are added dimensions to our perception of other people. Firstly, the authors contend that we perceive others as causal agents, as having intentionality. They also suggest that "...we perceive other people as similar to ourselves," and we feel capable of understanding others through our own experiences and feelings.[14] While the processes of object and people perception may be very closely related, what of the perception of nations? For the purposes of this paper we will assume that individuals perceive and form judgments of nations in much the same manner as they perceive and form judgments of people. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, for we cannot imagine that the brain uses a fundamentally different cognitive process in order to perceive a nation than that which it uses to perceive anything else. Since much of the perception of another nation involves the perception of the decision-making elite, we are dealing to a great extent with

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[13]Ibid., p. 43.

[14]Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka, op. cit., pp. 10-12.

the process of person perception anyway.

Judgments of a nation may well be inferential in nature. Inferences have been compared to syllogisms, such as,

> All red-haired men are aggressive. This man has red hair. Therefore he is aggressive.[15]

This is simple enough to extend to the area of international relations, as in the following example:

> Communism is an ideology which makes a state hostile and expansionist. China is a communist state. Therefore China is hostile and expansionist.

Both association rules and identification rules can be modified in much the same manner.

Our discussion thus far has dealt with judgments resulting from certain psychological processes. However, we must realize that judgments are not always the result of processes such as these, but may be instead reflections of the environmental milieu in which the individual is brought up. For instance, many people grow into adulthood prejudiced and bigoted simply because their parents and peers were bigoted, not because they have consciously or unconsciously inferred anything from the behavior of people of another race. Similarly, attitudes towards particular individuals may be learned from persons whom one respects, and attitudes such as these are often never questioned. No doubt the same type of phenomena occurs with regard to images of nations. A nation

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[15]Mark Cook, op. cit., p. 32.

may be characterized as "good" or "evil" by one's parents, teachers, or friends. Unsophisticated or unquestioning individuals may simply absorb these judgments and act upon them. Hopefully, the individuals making foreign policy decisions are somewhat more politically sophisticated than those who follow unhesitatingly the opinions of others, but it would be näive to believe that they could ever totally escape the influence of their formative years.

Deutsch and Merritt concur with this point, and explain that,

> Men conform, admire and obey largely within the limits of the images and habits that they have learned earlier and that they have made into a part of their inner selves.[16]

And Kenneth Boulding agrees that "...impressions of nationality are formed mostly in childhood and usually in the family group."[17]

Not surprisingly, the types of national images which are held by an individual reflect something of the personality of that individual. William A. Scott contends that,

> ...there is the suggestion that many different specific images may be colored by common themes reflecting the person's general world-view, or

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[16]Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images", in Kelman, ed. op. cit., p. 183.

[17]Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 424.

> perhaps more basic characteristics of his personality.[18]

For instance, it was found that, in general, pessimistic individuals hold negative national images and a negative view of the world at large.[19] More negative national images were also to be found in personally aggressive individuals.[20] There appears to be a "widespread disposition" for individuals to either like or dislike other nations generally.[21] Scott points out that "people tend to attribute favorable characteristics to nations (or groups or individuals) they like and unfavorable characteristics to those they dislike."[22] Holsti concurs with this statement, and explains that these types of images often reinforce themselves. This is because we expect those nations which we consider friendly to be friendly, and those which we perceive as hostile to be hostile. Concerned primarily with the image of the enemy, Holsti expands on this idea.

> When the other party is viewed within the framework of an "inherent bad faith" model the image of the enemy is clearly self-perpetuating, for the model itself denies the existence of data that could disconfirm it.[23]

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[18]William A. Scott, "Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., p. 77.

[19]Ibid., p. 87.

[20]Ibid., pp. 90-91.

[21]Ibid., p. 72.

[22]Ibid., p. 82.

[23]Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy", Journal of International Affairs 21 (January, 1967): 16-39.

Another important characteristic of images is the rigidity with which they are most often held. We may recall that this is true of other types of perceptions as well. National images can be held just as rigidly as other types of beliefs. We have probably all experienced the frustration of attempting to change another person's views, especially if those views are very important to the individual. The same is true of national images. People's images of other nations, regardless of how they were formed, are often highly resistant to change. If the image which one holds of a nation is central to his belief system, then it will be even more important for that individual to maintain that image. This is because central images are important "...to the extent that other images depend upon them."[24] In other words, central images do not stand alone, but usually serve as the point at which many other images are formed. For example, a central image may be that "Communist states are dangerous and expansionist." From this starting point, the decision-maker may develop images of what the Soviet Union and China are like, beliefs about how these states should be dealt with at the diplomatic level, and even ideas about what domestic defense policy should be. Because this general image of "Communist states" is so important, so central, to change it would require a major upheaval in the thinking of the individ-

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[24]Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., p. 174.

ual. This is psychologically distressing, and most people would rather keep their images and beliefs intact than attempt to develop an entire new set.

This also explains why most individuals would prefer to seek out information which confirms their own images instead of searching for information which contradicts them. And even if the person does come into contact with information contrary to what he believes, that information may simply be discarded as untrue or unimportant.[25] On the other hand, the information may be absorbed by the individual, but may be "selectively screened and distorted" until it in fact reinforces the original image.[26]

Kenneth Boulding suggests that three things may happen when a message (i.e. some information) "hits" an image. The image may remain unaffected by the message, it may simply be added to, or there may be a "revolutionary change" in the image.[27] A message may also result in the clarification of the image, or it may cast doubt on it.[28] Deutsch and Merritt feel that external events produce similar

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[25]See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) for a detailed exploration of this and related processes.

[26]Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events in National and International Images", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., p. 145.

[27]Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 7-8.

[28]Ibid., p. 10.

types of effects.[29] The image may be reinforced, or no significant change in the image may result. Explicit information might be added to the image, or implicit information may be added, resulting in the clarification of the image. However, the image may also be reorganized, or the importance of the image may be changed.

Ole Holsti explains what the individual may do if information is received which contradicts his attitudes (or images).[30] The source of the incongruent information may be discredited. Or, the individual may seek out new information which supports his original beliefs. A person may stop thinking about the discrepancy, thereby making it easier to live with, or engage in wishful thinking about how things should be. As previously mentioned, the discrepant information may be reinterpreted to support the pre-existing beliefs, or it may be differentiated into categories thereby making it simpler to deal with. Last, the information may be accepted, resulting in a change in attitude. Clearly, any of these processes may occur if new, contradictory information is received by an individual holding a particular national image.

It is evident that perception and image formation

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[29]Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images", in Kelman, ed., op. cit., pp. 139-140.

[30]Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy", op. cit., pp. 20-21.

are highly complex processes; it is equally evident that they are extremely important ones. Having explained something of the nature of these phenomena, we will proceed to our study of Dulles. We have previously indicated that the main purpose of this paper is to suggest and demonstrate a method through which national images may be ascertained. The proposed method will be described in the following sections. The groundwork of the study is to be provided in the next chapter, and the results presented in the final one.

CHAPTER IV

PREPARATION AND PROCEDURE

Having completed a review of the pertinent literature, and a discussion of perception as it relates to national image, we will now turn our attention to several matters which have a direct bearing on the case study. This chapter will therefore be divided into three segments. The first will provide the reader with a brief sketch of the man to be analysed, John Foster Dulles. Also, the reasons for choosing Dulles as our subject will be discussed, and finally the rationale for the selection of the four states under consideration will be set out.

Key to any research project is an awareness of the types of source materials available. In conducting the search for information about Dulles, it became evident that a wide range of sources can furnish such information; it also became evident that certain sources are, in general, preferable to others. The second segment of this chapter consists of a discussion of these materials, and some of the problems inherent in their use. Content analysis as a tool with which to analyse such sources will also be considered. The final segment is a statement of the method to be employed in the case study, and a discussion of the choice of documents to be analysed.

We will proceed, then, with a description of our subject. Although a complete biography clearly cannot be

presented here, Dulles' life and career will be briefly outlined.

The Subject: John Foster Dulles

John Foster Dulles, American Secretary of State from 1953 until 1959, was one of the most controversial men of his time. Highly intelligent and legalistic in the extreme, Dulles was never a truly popular figure in the eyes of the American public. However, this is not to suggest that the public was unaware of or unconcerned about Dulles. Instead, he was,

> ...hated and revered, distrusted and esteemed, feared and cherished. He rarely evoked indifference.[1]

Dulles was born in Washington, D.C., on February 25, 1888. The son of Reverend Allen Macy Dulles and Edith Foster Dulles, he was brought up as a strict Presbyterian. His religious attitudes and principles affected him profoundly in both his personal and political affairs. Dulles was an honors student in school, and continued his education at Princeton, and at the Sorbonne in Paris. He proceeded to study law at George Washington University, from which he graduated in 1911. The New York firm of Sullivan and Cromwell hired him shortly afterward, and Dulles rapidly became a successful corporation lawyer. He had, however, become very interested in politics early in his life. Not only was

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[1]Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 15.

Dulles related to two former Secretaries of State,[2] but at the age of nineteen he had accompanied his grandfather to the Second Hague Peace Conference, where his knowledge of French enabled him to serve as a general secretary.

During the First World War, Dulles served for the War Trade Board, since he was ineligible for active service due to his poor vision. After the War, he acted as counsel for the American delegation to the Reparations Commission in Versailles. In 1920, Dulles again joined Sullivan and Cromwell, where he quickly assumed the senior partnership of the firm. Dulles' corporate dealings enabled him to travel extensively, particularly to Europe and to Central and South America. Although an active and prosperous lawyer, Dulles' interest turned increasingly to international affairs as the Second World War approached. When the War began, he became an advisor and legal counsel to several foreign purchasing missions. He also played a major role in the creation of the Commission for a Just and Durable Peace, -- an international organization of churches dedicated to the preservation of peace.

In 1945, Dulles acted as an advisor to the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference; he also served as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly

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[2]Dulles' maternal grandfather, John Watson Foster, became Secretary of State to President Benjamin Harrison in 1892, and one of his aunt's husbands, Robert Lansing, served in that capacity to President Woodrow Wilson from 1915 to 1920.

for several years thereafter. During 1949, Foster Dulles had his first taste of electoral politics. He was appointed by Governor Thomas E. Dewey to a vacant seat in the Senate. His tenure, however, was brief, for he was defeated by Herbert Lehman in an election the following November. This, however, was by no means the end of Dulles' involvement in the political arena. In 1950, Dulles was appointed by then President H.E. Truman to personally negotiate the Japanese Peace Treaty. He handled the negotiations expertly, and "the Japanese peace treaty remains one of the most lasting accomplishments of his public career.[3]

On January 21, 1953, John Foster Dulles assumed the position of Secretary of State, thereby cementing a close working association with President Dwight Eisenhower which was to last until Dulles' death in 1959. Dulles never enjoyed the popularity that Eisenhower maintained with the public; on the other hand, the President greatly respected Dulles' experience and expertise in foreign affairs.

During his tenure, Dulles was instrumental in initiating both the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Bagdad Pact. He was one of the strongest advocates of the European Defense Community; Dulles also took a firm stand against the Peoples' Republic of China in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. The Secretary played a large role in

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[3]Richard Goold-Adams, The Time of Power (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), p. 61.

the construction of the Austrian State Treaty and the Trieste Agreement. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, Dulles was quick to press the U.N. General Assembly into halting the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.

Dulles' vehement anti-communism and his propensity for turning international conflicts into battles between the forces of good and the forces of evil made the Secretary highly controversial, not only in the United States, but in other nations as well. He died in May, 1959, of cancer, just one month after resigning his post because of his poor health.[4]

There are several reasons for the choice of Dulles as the subject of this study. We need not expound at length upon the fact that Dulles was indeed a key decision-maker, occupying an extremely powerful position in the American government. Although he worked closely with Eisenhower, it is generally accepted that Dulles was indeed the architect of American foreign policy from 1953 to 1959.[5] We are in complete agreement with the assumption that,

> ...the higher in the hierarchy of the foreign policy organization an individual's role is, the more likely are his personality characteristics to affect foreign policy decisions.[6]

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[4]Several biographies are available on Dulles. For a complete listing, the reader is referred to the Appendix to this work.

[5]For a brief discussion of the Dulles-Eisenhower relationship, see Goold-Adams, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

[6]Margaret G. Hermann, "Leader Personality and Foreign Policy Behavior", in James N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 202.

It is therefore evident that Dulles' psychology, specifically his images, had a definite impact upon the decisions which he made.

Dulles' authoritative position in foreign policy-making stemmed not only from his personal qualities, but from the nature of the Eisenhower administration itself. According to a prominent biographer,

> The Presidency was not the ideal office in which Eisenhower's positive qualities could be valuably deployed. He knew little about the economy, American social conditions, the culture of the nation, the history of the world and of international relations.[7]

Eisenhower, therefore, delegated a great deal of his authority to those more knowledgeable than himself in these various areas. He was an administrator, a supervisor of the activities of his specialists. Because of this, Dulles was granted a great deal of authority in the area of foreign policy.

> The Constitution of the United States vests in the President, on the executive side, the exclusive responsibility for decisions on foreign policy. But supposing he does not know what to decide without the prompting of his Secretary of State? Then to all intents and purposes, the power granted by the Constitution to the President becomes devolved upon the Secretary.[8]

It has been noted elsewhere that the individual's psychology will have a greater impact on decisions when the decision-maker is acting alone, or with only a few colleagues.

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[7]Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1964), p. 70.

[8]Ibid., p. 71.

This was certainly the case with Dulles. The Secretary was very poor at delegating responsibility, and felt that a job could best be done if he himself did it. Indeed, one of the reasons that Dulles travelled more frequently and extensively than had any of his predecessors was that he felt that he could not depend on information received from sources other than himself.

John Foster Dulles was a man of strong convictions. He was deeply religious, and often dogmatic. The images held by such a man will perhaps be more easily ascertained than those of an individual not holding such strong opinions, or having such rigid ideas of right and wrong, good and evil.

> Dulles was not a personality of pastel hues. He was as near to being a man of black-and-white convictions as a rational mind could justify.[9]

Dulles' images may therefore be more easily discernable than would those of a man with less firmly-held beliefs.

Lastly, the research already conducted by Ole R. Holsti into John Foster Dulles' images of the Soviet Union provides us with a sound example of the utility of content analysis in the study of national images, and an opportunity to utilize similar techniques to ascertain even more about Dulles' images.[10]

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[9]Drummond and Coblentz, op. cit., p. 14.

[10]Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, Calif., 1962).

As previously suggested, we have chosen to examine Dulles' images of four nations, -- Hungary, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Great Britain. These four states were deeply involved in two of the major international events occurring during the Dulles' tenure as State Secretary, -- the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Hungarian Revolution of the same year. Due to the magnitude of these events, references to these states should be numerous and readily accessible. The sources from which such references, and other types of pertinent information may be obtained are to be considered next.

The Sources: Primary and Secondary Sources

It is a truism that,

> Nearly all research in the social sciences and humanities depends in one way or another on careful reading of written materials.[11]

This is clearly the case when one is involved in researching an individual decision-maker. Consequently, it is essential that the researcher be familiar with the types of written materials available to him, and to select very carefully those works upon which to base his study.

There are available a great many types of sources which the student may wish to examine in conducting his research. These range from personal diaries to objective biographies, from national addresses to editorials. Generally, however, resource materials can be broadly classified

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[11] Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), p. 2.

into two categories, -- primary and secondary sources. While primary sources include those materials written (or actually spoken) by the individual under study, secondary sources are writings about the individual, or are interpretations of his writing.

It cannot be stated unequivocally that one of these bodies of literature is always more truthful or accurate than the other, for both types of materials have their merits and their shortcomings. The secondary source, for example, can easily become the victim of the values and biases of its author. Whether the author is a personal friend, a political opponent, or a great admirer of the subject will doubtlessly influence his writings to a certain extent. Not only the manner, be it favorable or unfavorable, in which the decision-maker is presented, but the facts and events themselves may be distorted in order to fit the author's own prejudices. At least the interpretation of these facts and events may be suspect. An author may have overt or covert motives for writing about a decision-maker, which could lead to an exaggerated or blatantly false impression of the individual. The audience to which the literature is directed will have some bearing upon what is written; lack of information, or misinformation, may affect the validity of the work; and the emphasis placed on particular events or characteristics may in fact tell us more about the author than about the subject.

Nonetheless, secondary sources can be of great service to the student. They generally draw from a wide

range of other materials, both primary and secondary, and combine various ideas, theories, and bodies of information. Often the material is dealt with in a basically objective and methodical manner. If used correctly, such materials often provide a broader and more objective picture of the individual than might otherwise be obtained. Secondary sources may be purely descriptive or intensely analytical, and of course vary greatly in their usefulness to the researcher.

Although secondary documents can prove extremely valuable to the study of individual decision-makers, we feel that the primary source will in fact tell us more about his personal psychology, the area in which we are interested. The primary source, or "first person document" has been defined by Gordon W. Allport as,

> ...any self-revealing record that intentionally or unintentionally yields information regarding the structure, dynamics, and functioning of the author's mental life. It may record the participant's view of experiences in which he has been involved; it may devote itself deliberately to self-scrutiny and self-description; or it may be only incidentally and unwittingly self-revealing.[12]

Primary sources have their limitations also. Many of these are discussed by Allport in The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science.[13] Among the most important criticisms

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[12]Gordon W. Allport, The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1942), p. xii.

[13]Ibid., pp. 125-142.

levelled at these materials are that they, even more than secondary sources, are almost always directed toward a particular audience. This audience may well determine if not what is being said, then at least how it is being said. For instance, we may suspect that a statement made in Parliament may differ rather sharply from a comment on the same subject made in a private conversation over cocktails. An address presented to a national convention may reflect quite different sentiments from those expressed in a personal diary. These differences may be in content as well as in emphasis.

Another factor influencing what a decision-maker writes or says is his motivation. He may be attempting to persuade or enrage, concern or appease a particular public. This, too, will be reflected in his material. Any number of factors, -- the constraints of office, the international situation, domestic pressures, -- may influence that which an individual says or writes. Allport points out that the author may also be subject to oversimplification of events, to errors of memory, and to unreliability due to the effects of his moods.[14]

Despite the limitations inherent in the use of primary sources, these writings provide the researcher with a more accurate picture of the "mental life" of the author than will secondary sources. Regardless of mood or motivation, writing style or misinformation, something of the

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[14]Ibid., pp. 134-135.

individual will be reflected in those thoughts he commits to paper. Hitler's Mein Kampf is a case in point. The primary source, then, is the body of written materials from which we will derive the most information about the workings of the individual's mind. This is the general source from which we will derive information about Dulles' images of the four states under consideration.

By their very nature, primary sources are highly subjective materials. How, then, can the researcher proceed to analyse these sorts of materials in an objective and scientific manner? Clearly, one individual reading through hundreds of personal documents and drawing conclusions from them would not meet any scientific standards. One method which has attempted to overcome this problem, and has met with considerable success, is content analysis. This technique has become increasingly popular as a research tool, and has lent some measure of credibility to many studies involving the use of various types of written materials.

A fairly broad definition of content analysis has been developed by Ole R. Holsti and Philip J. Stone, who define the method as,

> ...any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages.[15]

In a similar vein, Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew contend that,

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[15]Holsti, op. cit., p. 14.

> Content analysis is a systematic technique for analysing message content and message handling -- it is a tool for observing and analysing the overt communication behavior of selected communicators.[16]

Content analysis, then, is a research tool enabling the researcher to scientifically examine the content of various types of messages. Several methods have been employed, and a wide variety of communications studied. Representatives of highly diverse fields of study have employed the technique. With the aid of computer analyses, the speed and precision of the method has greatly increased. Politics and folklore, journalism and linguistics, psychotherapy and biograpy, -- all have been subject to some form of content analysis.[17] Content analysis will be employed in the current work; a statement of the method to be used is contained in the following section.

The Materials and Method

The materials chosen for content analysis are transcripts of Dulles' press conferences. As it may be surprising that we have decided to utilize only one source of Dulles' personal documents, some justification must be given in order to explain this choice. We believe that the press

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[16]Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of Communications (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 2.

[17]For a comprehensive study of the numerous directions taken by researchers, see Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Trends in Content Analysis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959).

conference is the most useful of the personal documents. This source alone will provide a tool by which national images may be accurately ascertained. We are not alone in making this assumption, for Margaret Hermann has been quoted as describing these materials as "the most spontaneous and situationally relevant public data available."[18] Regardless of the number of such conferences a statesman may hold, he generally cannot be assured of the exact questions that he will be asked, nor can he be totally prepared with tailor-made responses. His reactions to questions from the press will, therefore, be far more self-revealing that would be any prepared speech or statement.

In his analysis of Dulles, Ole Holsti's findings indicate that the "...evaluation of Soviet hostility presented to the press was consistently low", in comparison with the evaluations obtained from his messages to other audiences.[19] Holsti suggests that one reason for this may be that the press does not have to be persuaded of anything, as do other audiences such as Congress or pressure groups. It is also suggested that,

> ...the press corps, as a relatively sophisticated and knowledgeable group may neither need, nor be likely to welcome, sermonizing on the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat.[20]

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[18]Ian Montgomerie, "A Critique of the Works of Margaret G. Hermann", University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1977. (Mimeographed).

[19]Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union", op. cit., p. 153.

[20]Ibid., p. 154.

This phenomenon lends credence to the argument that a decision-maker's images may be better ascertained from press conferences than from other sources. The present study, then, is an attempt to compile a composite of Dulles' images from this source alone.

The complete set of Dulles' press conference transcripts is to be found in the Seely G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University, New Jersey. Not only the conferences, but the entire collection of Dulles' papers are to be found there. However, since a trip to New Jersey is not a feasible proposition, and the cost of having the conferences copied and mailed is prohibitive, we turned to those press conferences published in The New York Times. The Times is held on microfilm at the University of Alberta.

Evaluative assertion analysis, the method of content analysis selected for this study, can be used to measure the way in which an individual regards a certain "attitude object". This assessment is obtained by the transcription of statements into numerical form. The attitude objects under consideration here are Hungary, Egypt, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Although previously,[21] particular categories relating to the attitude objects have been selected for analysis, -- for example, the success or the hostility of Soviet foreign policy, -- we have chosen to analyse any evaluative statement made by Dulles about the four

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[21]Ibid., pp. 244-245.

nations.[22] It must be noted that the statements chosen deal only with assertions about the governmental elite of the state in question; statements about the general public, or personal remarks about government leaders, are disregarded. In this way, we should attain an accurate assessment of Dulles' images of the nations in question.

Initially, sentences referring to these states were transcribed from their source, -- The New York Times transcripts, -- and then re-written into two basic sentence forms. These forms are:

1) Attitude object / verb / common-meaning evaluator.
   eg. Soviet leaders / are / evil.
2) Attitude object / verb / second attitude object.
   eg. Soviet leaders / attack / American interests.[23]

Portions of statements which were non-evaluative, such as facts or hypothetical statements, were discarded, and the evaluative portions assigned numerical values between +3 and -3. Each verb, and each evaluator or second attitude object, was assigned a value. As Holsti explains,

> For verbs, the number is determined by the intensity of the verb and the sign is contingent upon whether the verb is associative (+) or dissociative (-). Similarly, evaluators are given values on the basis of favorable (+) or unfavorable (-) evaluation, and on the

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[22]Apart from this one difference, we follow Holsti's method as set out in his dissertation, pp. 244-251. Holsti himself has modified the original method; see p. 249.

[23]Ibid., p. 245.

intensity of the evaluation.[24]

The following section is quoted at length from Holsti, in order that the method be completely understood.[25]

> While the rules that guide the process of assigning values do not cover every contingency, most guesswork has been eliminated. The direction (+ or -) presents little problem and can be ascertained from a common sense reading of the sentence. The values given the verbs follow these general guides:
>
> ±3 Verbs of strong intensity and unqualified simple verbs in the present tense.
> Examples: "to be", "to have", "attacks", "supports"
>
> ±2 Verbs of moderate intensity and verbs implying partial, probable or imminent association or dissociation.
> Examples: "tries to help", "plans to destroy", "probably is"
>
> ±1 Verbs of weak intensity and verbs implying only a hypothetical relationship between the attitude object and the evaluator.
> Examples: "May be", "perhaps has," "might agree to"
>
> In case of evaluators, the values assigned correspond roughly to the linguistic quantifiers "extremely," "quite," and "slightly:"
>
> ±3 "extremely," "perfectly," "completely," "absolutely," "very," "definitely"
>
> ±2 "quite," "considerably," "fairly," "normally," "ordinarily"
>
> ±1 "slightly," "barely," "minimally," "somewhat," "a little bit"

Holsti provides a sample paragraph to more fully illustrate the method.

> Soviet foreign policy is conducted by ruthless, atheistic despots who despise spiritual values. These men have in the past pursued goals which we deem to be evil. Yet there now appears some possibility that they will agree to some measures designed to relax world tensions. Perhaps they will be more willing to forgo aggressive designs.

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[24] Ibid., pp. 245-246.

[25] The following is taken from Ibid., pp. 246-247.

	Attitude Object	Verb	Value	Evaluator	Value
1.	Soviet rulers	are	+3	despots	-3
2.	Soviet rulers	are	+3	ruthless	-3
3.	Soviet rulers	are	+3	athestic	-3
4.	Soviet rulers	despise	-3	spiritual values	+3
5.	Soviet rulers	have in the past pursued	+2	evil goals	-3
6.	Soviet rulers	may now agree to	+1	some measures designed to relax world tensions	+2
7.	Soviet rulers	may be more willing to forgo	-1	aggressive designs	-3

26

Following the assignment of the values, the two numbers assigned to each statement are multiplied, providing a product for each. In the above example, the products would be -9; -9; -9; -9; -6; +2 and +3. The negative products are, of course, reached because a negative sign always dominates a positive one when the two numbers are multiplied. The products are then added together, and divided by three times the number of statements analysed. This keeps the final value between -3 and +3, and provides the researcher with a clear indication of how favorably or unfavorably the attitude object is perceived.

Of course, some statements may prove somewhat more difficult to deal with than others. For example, consider the following sentence:

> The Soviet attitude, while basically disagreeable, is at least evidencing a shift towards becoming slightly more humanistic and less repressive than it was under Stalin.

The sentence can be broken down as follows:

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[26]Ibid., pp. 247-248.

1) Soviet attitude / is / basically disagreeable.
2) Soviet attitude / is at least evidencing / a shift towards becoming slightly more humanistic than it was under Stalin.
3) Soviet attitude / is at least evidencing / a shift towards becoming slightly less repressive than it was under Stalin.

The first sentence would be coded as a +3 for "is" and a -3 for "basically disagreeable", resulting in a product of -9. Statement number two is not quite so straight-forward. The phrase "is at least evidencing" contains the word "is", but because of the nature of the remainder of the phrase, cannot be coded as a +3. This statement should be coded as a +1. "Evidencing" is not a very strong verb, and even further qualified by the words "at least". The last portion of the statement is only slightly complimentary; describing the attitude of a state as "slightly more humanistic than it was under Stalin" is hardly an endorsement of the system. This phrase, too, would be coded as a +1. The two values of +1 result in a product of +1, -- a slightly positive evaluation. This seems intuitively correct, as the statement itself can appropriately be described as "slightly positive".

The third statement can be coded in the same manner as the second, because being "slightly less repressive than it was under Stalin" is, again, only slightly favorable. This statement, too, would result in a product of +1. While

statements such as the above sometimes prove problematical, they can generally be evaluated by breaking them down and carefully analysing their component parts.

It is important to note at this point that content analyses have occasionally dealt with "antecedents of content". In other words, some studies have attempted to discover the "motives, values, beliefs, and attitudes" underlying that which has been spoken or written by the individual.[27] While this aspect of analysis would doubtlessly prove fascinating, it is not one with which we have chosen to deal in this study. Our primary purpose in conducting this analysis is to demonstrate one method by which national image data may be obtained. Although the content of the images should be interesting, the factors giving rise to these images are not important to this study.

Due to the fact that the focus of this analysis is method, hypotheses as to the actual content of Dulles' images are not really necessary. However, one cannot undertake a study such as this without engaging in some speculation as to what the findings will be. It is a foregone conclusion that Dulles' image of the Soviet Union will be very negative; findings to the contrary would be surprising indeed. One would assume that his assessment of Hungary would be quite favorable, as this state was probably perceived as an innocent

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[27]For further discussion of the antecedents of content, see Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, op. cit., pp. 68-72.

victim of an aggressive and hostile power. It is likely that Egypt was seen in a negative light; her aggressive actions preceding the Suez Crisis would not have aroused a great deal of sympathy in the West. The way in which Great Britain would have been perceived at this time is difficult to imagine. Although a close ally of the United States, Dulles was quick to condemn the British action in the Suez situation. And Dulles himself had a greater affinity for France and Germany than he had for Britain, at least on a personal basis. In the following chapter, the results of this analysis will be presented and discussed, followed by a summary and general conclusion.

CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY AND CONCLUSIONS

In conducting the content analysis of Dulles' press conferences, we have arrived at some interesting, and some surprising results. The actual image data is only one result; we are also now in a position from which to better evaluate the method employed in this study. We are reinforced in our belief that the evaluative assertion analysis of a decision-maker's press conferences is a valuable research tool. Despite limitations inherent in the method, we believe that it may be utilized to great advantage as a means of assessing national images. Therefore, we will begin by commenting on the method itself.

Evaluation of the Method

We are convinced that evaluative assertion analysis has merit of a tool of research; we are also certain that press conferences are in fact the best sources available from which image data may be obtained. While this method will prove valuable to future researchers, it is also necessary to point out some areas in which the researcher must exercise caution.

The first such consideration is a very basic one, -- the availability of sources. In the present study, we utilized the press conference transcripts found in The New York Times. The Times provided us with the complete transcripts of sixty-two of Dulles' press conferences. However,

approximately fifteen of his first conferences were summarized or only partially recorded by the newspaper, and these were not utilized in our study. While we were fortunate in that The Times did give us a verbatim record of the majority of conferences, the point to be made is that a researcher must obtain the most complete data possible, and assess the cost of doing so, before beginning a research project. If a researcher decides to use press conferences, he must first ensure that the individual being studied held enough of them to be confident that patterns of images will emerge from the analysis. While we obtained enough conferences for this study, the researcher must be aware of the possibility that some decision-makers may not choose to hold very many press conferences. Although most do spend a reasonable amount of time talking to the press, there is always a possibility that a particular individual may shun this aspect of public life. Press conferences, too, may be sporadic, in that individuals who travel a great deal may often not be available. This created some difficulty for us.

It must also be recognized that the members of the press themselves control the content of the conference to a large extent. They are, after all, asking the questions. This particular problem is not of much relevance in the case of Dulles (who talked at length about the Soviets whether he was asked to or not) but might apply to less strongly-opinionated individuals.

The major problem with evaluative assertion analysis

is the fact that several types of statements cannot be coded at all. If there were a method for evaluating these statements, they could tell us much more about relevant images. One type of statement which is difficult to classify is the hypothetical statement.[1] Consider the following:

> It would, of course, be impossible for us if, at any point where the Soviets made a proposal, we immediately cap it with a better proposal. That would mean by no expenditure at all the Soviets could engage us in immense expenditure. That would be just falling into another kind of trap.[2]

Although the message conveyed has a clearly negative quality, it cannot properly be coded. Due to the highly conditional nature of the paragraph, it would be improper to assign values to a statement such as, "Soviets could engage us in immense expenditure." The sentences quoted also come very close to statements of fact. Dulles' words are in fact true, although they imply a great deal of distrust. Statements of fact carry with them their own set of problems.

> We take the position, as you know, that nothing the Soviet itself can do can relieve the Soviet

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[1]The decision not to utilize hypothetical statements is based on our belief that such statements, due to their conditional nature, cannot be scientifically evaluated by the method used. It is, however, important to note that these types of statements have been employed in other areas of research, and are considered a valuable research tool. See, for instance, Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 394-395.

[2]Press Conference Transcript, The New York Times, Nov. 30, 1955, p. 8.

of its international obligations.[3]

Clearly, this is a factual statement. The underlying implication, however, is that the Soviet Union is trying to rid itself of its obligations. Implications cannot be coded. To do so would lead to a great deal of subjectivity. The researcher would actually be evaluating what he thinks the decision-maker meant, not what he actually said. Due to this problem, the evaluator would have to deal with this type of information on a subjective, as opposed to empirical level.

Decision-makers, of course, select their facts very carefully. Facts themselves may be "positive" or "negative" in nature. A "positive fact" might be, "The British economy is improving", while a "negative fact" might be that, "The Soviet economy is worsening". Dulles probably chose to mention more statements of fact that were negative in nature when he spoke of the Soviets than when he referred to the British. The question here is one more of emphasis than content, yet an analysis of the types of factual statements chosen by a decision-maker might well reveal something of his images.

Philosophical ramblings on the part of a decision-maker also prove difficult to deal with at the empirical level. One example appears on page 84 of this work, in which Dulles talks at length about Egypt, without actually saying

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[3]Press Conference Transcript, The New York Times, Dec. 7, 1955, p. 16.

anything definite. This brings us to another insight about the Secretary. The actual manner in which he answered questions dealing with the various states differed considerably. In contrast to the blunt, straightforward responses given to questions about the Soviet Union, we have his very contorted answer to a very direct question about Egypt. On the other hand, Dulles often launched into a discourse about the evils of the Soviet regime at the slightest provocation. While this finding is difficult to quantify, it, too, highlights the differences in the ways he treated the two states.

For purposes of empirical analysis, however, philosophical statements cannot adequately be dealt with. These types of statements usually contain an underlying implication, -- an implication which, if utilized, would lead to decreased objectivity. In the following sentences, Dulles is obviously criticizing Soviet actions, both past and present. The statements, however, cannot legitimately be coded without detracting from the objectivity of the statements.

> You do not destroy the reputation of a man who has been a demigod for twenty-five years without taking some risks. You do not impair what has been the sacred creed of Communism for twenty-five years and change it in essential respects without taking certain risks. You do not offer hope to people who have aspirations for greater spiritual and material freedoms than they have now without increasing the volume of the pressure.[4]

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[4]Press Conference Transcript, The New York Times, May 16, 1956, p. 8.

Although it may be possible to extract some codable material from these statements, or from the other examples provided, we chose to discard them rather than risk the loss of objectivity which we felt would result. Obviously, it is all but impossible for a human being to remain completely objective, -- totally unbiased, -- when conducting most types of research. The possibility of subjectivity can never be discounted. However, the awareness of this problem may itself lead to better research. As long as the researcher questions and justifies his decisions, he is guarding against human error.

The analysis of a decision-maker's images of other nations might be further highlighted by the analysis of his assertions regarding his own state. For instance, one might attempt to assess Dulles' image of the United States. If one were to isolate discrete categories, this type of study could provide a clear indication of the role which the decision-maker sees his own state playing on the international stage. This, when balanced against image data from other nations, might provide an even fuller perspective than one obtains by using data on other states alone.

Evaluative assertion analysis cannot assure total objectivity, and press conferences cannot be guaranteed to represent the exact thoughts of a decision-maker. But a combination of the method and the source bring us close to determining the extent to which the decision-maker perceives a state as favorable or unfavorable, good or bad. And those

types of perceptions play an extremely important role in international relations. The results of the case study follow.

Results of the Study

Chart A, below, contains the basic information obtained from the press conferences held while Dulles was Secretary of State, from 1953 to 1959. As previously mentioned, The New York Times provided us with the complete transcripts of sixty-two of these conferences. We have also indicated that fifteen of the earlier conferences could not be analysed. However, even by comparing the lower figure of sixty-two with the six complete years which he spent in office, we can recognize that Dulles was in fact very accessible to the press. The number of conferences that he held provides us with a good sample from which to extract image data.

CHART A

Attitude Object	Hungary	Great Britain	Egypt	Soviet Union
Number of Statements Analysed	0	17	26	477
Value obtained - between +3 and -3	-	+2.21	-0.16	-1.27
Number of Conferences Analysed	62			

A most striking feature of these results is the extremely large number of evaluative assertions made by Dulles about the Soviet Union. The negative value was, of course, expected; we had in fact acticipated it would be lower. These findings, however, make it clear that Dulles was completely preoccupied with the Soviet Union. While it has never been a secret that Dulles disliked the Soviets, this analysis demonstrates how largely his thinking was dominated by his preoccupation with the Soviet state. In fact, the only other state which received any comparable degree of attention was the Peoples' Republic of China. It could be argued that Dulles was a product of the Cold War, and that any Secretary of State in the fifties would have been obsessed by the Soviet threat. It is doubtful, however, that another decision-maker would have made eleven times the number of evaluative statements about the Soviet Union than about the other three states combined. This is especially true when one considers that one of these states was a very important ally, and that all three were involved in crisis situations which directly involved the United States. And although it appears initially that the lack of references on Dulles' part to the other three states will not tell us a great deal about his images, this is not in fact the case. The significance of this lack of references will be explored later in the chapter.

At this point, it is worth mentioning that Dulles' value assertions about the states were not generally made in

direct response to questions, but most often occurred as he expanded upon the issue and nation under consideration. This was particularly evident when he spoke of the Soviet Union, as Dulles frequently would answer the question put to him, and proceed to elaborate upon his original response.

Regardless of his moral judgments about the Soviet regime, Dulles did have a grudging respect for Soviet achievements and capabilities. This, in fact, caused some problems in the analysis itself, as often statements of admiration for Soviet capabilities, and statements of condemnation of Soviet methods, cancelled each other out. This may well have accounted for the evaluation not being quite as negative as expected. Here we have evidence of the value of the analysis performed by Ole Holsti. As previously mentioned, Holsti factioned Dulles' image of the Soviet Union into five categories. These categories are: the hostility of Soviet foreign policy, the success of that foreign policy, Soviet capabilities, the degree of internal liberalization, and a general evaluation. By doing so, he was able to analyse each category separately. We were not able to factor analyse and compare the states. References, except those regarding the Soviet Union, were so few that we had to utilize every evaluative statement about the countries being considered, regardless of the category they fell into. The references to all three states were scattered broadly enough throughout the conferences to give us a good overview of Dulles' general images.

The time periods into which Dulles' statements about the Soviet Union fell are outlined in Chart B, below. The chart divides the number of evaluative statements made about the nation into six month periods throughout his tenure.

CHART B

Time Period	Number of References:	
	By Period	By Year
Jan. - June, 1953	0	5
July - Dec., 1953	5	
Jan. - June, 1954	0	0
July - Dec., 1954	0	
Jan. - June, 1955	1	34
July - Dec., 1955	33	
Jan. - June, 1956	149	180
July - Dec., 1956	31	
Jan. - June, 1957	26	97
July - Dec., 1957	71	
Jan. - June, 1958	88	134
July - Dec., 1958	46	
Jan. - Apr., 1959	27	27
Total	477	477

For the first two years, references are scanty, but much of this can be attributed to the lack of complete news conference transcripts recorded during this period. The relatively few references made during the latter half of 1956 can be explained by the unexpected absence of any press conferences held between mid-July and December of 1956.

This was a result of the fact that during this time Dulles had a hectic schedule of negotiating conferences and related political activities, followed by a confinement to hospital for a major operation. Unfortunately, this leaves us with a lack of material from a period of time which we had hoped would yield fruitful results, as both the Hungarian and Suez crises climaxed during this period. Although regrettable, this factor is not a serious drawback, as Dulles' tenure in office was long enough to compensate for this gap over the long term. This is substantiated by the large number of statements which we were able to retrieve about the Soviet Union within his period in office.

Although the number of statements made do exhibit some variation over time, this variation does not appear to be in response to particular world events. Clearly, Mr. Dulles was always capable of making some reference to the Soviet Union, despite the international situation.

With regard to the Soviet Union, then, we can state that Dulles was greatly preoccupied with the nation and the role which he saw it playing in international affairs. The large number of references to this state, in comparison to those made to other nations, attests to this fact. To the Secretary, the Soviet state was hostile and threatening. While he did have some degree of respect for Soviet achievements, the general image of the Soviet Union was a negative one.

Equally as striking as the great number of statements

which we find about the Soviet Union is the total lack of assertions, -- evaluative or otherwise, -- regarding Hungary. Considering the fact that Hungary was involved in a major crisis of this period, this absence of references is most interesting. However, we have previously noted the extent to which Dulles was preoccupied with the Soviet Union in general, and his lack of statements regarding Hungary may be directly related to this. We can argue that, in this case as in so many others, Dulles' attention was riveted on the Soviet Union. Instead of perceiving Hungary as a defenceless and pitiable victim, Dulles was more concerned with viewing the Soviet Union as a hostile and menacing aggressor. In a crisis in which both of these states were major actors, Dulles saw only the Soviets playing the leading role. The plight of Hungary paled beside the evil actions of the Soviet Union. This is a significant factor resulting in the lack of statements about Hungary herself.

These findings also indicate that Dulles was more concerned with the activities of the super-powers than with those of the small or middle powers. Although Hungary herself was a very salient item in the news, Dulles' interest lay with the Soviet Union. It is understandable that a decision-maker of this particular era would be more concerned with activities of the super-powers than those of lesser states, but it appears from the comparative numbers of references actually made that this was true of Dulles to a most considerable degree. It has been noted previously that

China was the only other state receiving an amount of attention comparable to that given the Soviets; smaller powers appear not to have figured in his thinking to any great extent whatsoever.

It must also be noted that the Soviet action in Hungary would doubtlessly have reinforced strongly Dulles' negative image of the Soviets. Dulles would once again have been "proved correct" in his assessment of that state, as its actions would have confirmed his image of the Communists as hostile and immoral. It is little wonder that he should choose to dwell on their threatening activities, rather than on the fate of the Hungarians.

Although the positive evaluation assigned to Great Britain was not totally unexpected, the relative lack of evaluative statements regarding this nation was. Because of her close alliance to the United States, and especially insofar as she took action in Egypt that was totally unacceptable to Dulles, one would imagine that she would figure more prominently in Dulles' thinking. It appears, however, that the image of Great Britain was also overshadowed by Dulles' predominant image of the Soviet Union. Most of the Secretary's statements about Britain were statements of fact, and tell us little about his attitude towards, or images of, that state. In fact, statements of fact outnumbered value assertions by approximately four to one (this equalling approximately fifty-one statements of fact to seventeen evaluative assertions). Dulles' factual statements

often related to matters such as past and proposed conferences and discussions in which both nations participated. An example of this type of statement comes from a news conference held in January of 1956.

> We have had talks on that general subject (banning bomb tests) with the United Kingdom over a considerable period of time. I had the first talks, I think, somewhere around two years ago, with Sir Anthony Eden when he was Foreign Minister, and we have been in frequent consultation with each other on that particular subject. I would say that the obstacles in the path are what we both recognized to be technical difficulties in the way of formulating a proposal which might be put to the Soviet, in a form which would really be protective of the interests of both sides.[5]

The timing of Dulles' evaluative statements regarding Britain may provide us with an indication of the way in which he perceived that state. The following chart furnishes the exact months in which Dulles made his assertions.

CHART C

Month/Year	Number of Assertions
December, 1955	3
January, 1956	4
May, 1956	2
December, 1956	1
August, 1957	1
October, 1957	6
Total	17

[5]Press Conference Transcript, The New York Times, Jan. 24, 1956, p. 8.

Here we find that from the May of 1956 until August of 1957, Dulles made only one evaluative statement about Britain. While in December of 1956, he referred to the violation of the NATO treaty by Britain, little else was said of British actions in the Middle East. We do not find the Secretary embarking on a moral crusade against the British as he so often did against the Soviets. It appears that strong moral judgments were reserved for the Communist powers. When he once again made value assertions regarding Britain, they were highly favorable in nature. Dulles stated that "close historical ties" existed between Great Britain and the United States, and that these ties were "warm and vigorous and vital".[6]

While the scarcity of references to Great Britain may in part be attributed to the lack of press conferences held during the latter half of 1956, this does not totally account for Dulles' lack of comment on British actions in the Suez. It is in fact possible that Dulles, consciously or not, retained a favorable image of the British despite their activities. He may, therefore, have attempted to screen their actions, and ignore, rather than condemn, Britain's attack. We recall from chapter three that individuals have difficulty in accepting information which is incongruent with pre-existing beliefs.

Whatever the reasons, we are left with a highly

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[6]Press Conference Transcript, The New York Times, Oct. 17, 1957, p. 14.

positive evaluation of Great Britain, despite her actions, and despite Dulles' well-known antipathy for Sir Anthony Eden. We must, therefore, conclude that other factors comprising Dulles' image of Britain (perhaps, in part, the "close historical ties") must have outweighed these two considerations, and left Dulles operating with a positive image of that state.

The nation of Egypt, too, seems to have suffered the same fate as both Britain and Hungary, in that very few evaluative statements were made of her. The following chart provides the time frame into which statements about Egypt fell.

CHART D

Month/Year	Number of Assertions
October, 1955	3
January, 1956	1
April, 1956	5
May, 1956	4
April, 1957	6
June, 1957	3
July, 1957	2
March, 1958	2
Total	26

Once again, the relative scarcity of statements about a middle power evidences a lack of great concern on the part of the Secretary. However, a most intriguing finding of

the analysis is the somewhat ambivolent value of -0.16 assigned to Egypt. In fact, in reading through the press conferences, it was noted that Dulles was, to a large extent, very careful about what he said regarding Egypt. He indeed appeared very slow to condemn Egypt, even when confronted with leading questions from the press. The following is quoted at length to illustrate this point.

> Q. Mr. Secretary, if Egypt should continue to maintain her belligerency, in your opinion would this indicate on Egypt's part a lack of decent respect for the opinions of mankind?
> A. That is a little difficult to answer, I think, in the abstract. The question of belligerency is pretty difficult to answer I think, except in terms of certain specifics. You might say, for example, that the United States, despite the Korean Armistice, exercises certain aspects of belligerency as regards Communist China -- the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, for example, are still in force. If without regard to the general question of "belligerency" you ask whether the Gaza Strip should be used as a base of Fedayeen activities, if you ask whether or not ships should be allowed to pass through the Strait of Tiran, and if you ask whether or not Israeli ships should be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal, then I can answer those three questions. I think I have answered them. But I don't want to get into abstractions which are pretty difficult to deal with.
> Q. Well, putting it on those specifics, those last three that you mentioned, if Egypt insisted on belligerency in those three points, would you then in your opinion think she would be showing a disregard for the decent opinions of mankind?
> A. Well, I can't speak for all of mankind. (Laughter.) How the rest of mankind would feel about it, I don't want to say, but I think as far as the public opinion of the United States is concerned, it would support the views which I have expressed here.[7]

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[7]Press Conference Transcript, The New York Times, Apr. 3, 1957, p. 8.

While Dulles' statements were slightly more negative during 1956 and 1957 than either before or after that period, the Secretary was nonetheless consistently fair in his judgments of Egypt. The same can be said of his treatment of the British. It is only with respect to the Soviet Union (and, we suspect, the Peoples' Republic of China) that Dulles became the moralistic sermonizer so well known to the public. Egypt, then, while not highly salient to the Secretary, was perceived in only a slightly unfavorable light. The fact that Dulles was constantly willing to give her the benefit of the doubt attests to his even-handedness with regard to this state.

Before we proceed with the general conclusions which were reached about the Secretary and his images, it must be noted that an interesting observation was made during the examination of the transcripts themselves. In his conversations with the press, Dulles usually used the word "we" when speaking of his attitudes about foreign policy. One would expect that a man possessing such knowledge of and definite opinions about world affairs, and in whom was vested such a degree of authority, would employ the pronoun "I" with greater frequency. Yet, Dulles seems to have been intent upon making himself appear to the world as simply the mouthpiece of the Eisenhower Administration. A possible explanation for this incongruity could be that Dulles was determined not to make the same mistake as that of a previous Secretary of State, -- his uncle, Robert Lansing. Herman Finer relates

that Lansing had been relieved of his duties by President Woodrow Wilson.[8] Wilson had taken this action because Lansing had consistently attempted to pursue an independent line in foreign policy, without due regard to the wishes of his President. Dulles, therefore, was highly cognizant of the importance of consulting with Eisenhower, and keeping him informed of all foreign policy matters and choices. Dulles' determination not to repeat his uncle's mistake, coupled with his genuine admiration of Eisenhower's capabilities, may well have accounted for his decision to use "we" in lieu of "I".

It has become apparent from this study that John Foster Dulles was in fact not as "black and white" in his thinking as has so often been assumed. In the course of our research, we have discovered several areas in which he presents himself as a great deal more complex than he has appeared in the past. Several dichotomies in Dulles' images have been revealed.

One such dichotomy has far-reaching implications for the study of national images. Consider the fact that while some states, such as the Soviet Union, were characterized unfavorably by the Secretary, and others, such as Great Britain, were perceived in a primarily favorable light, there does appear to have been a "grey area" in his thinking.

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[8]Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1964), pp. 71-72.

This was demonstrated by Dulles' apparent reluctance to condemn the state of Egypt. The explanation for this is that Dulles perceived certain nations to be threatening, and others as non-threatening. Although Egypt's actions may have been undesirable, she did not constitute a direct threat to the United States. Egypt was, therefore, spared the type of condemnation levelled at the Soviet Union, which of course posed a genuine threat to Dulles. In fact, the degree to which a decision-maker perceives a state as threatening or non-threatening is no doubt a crucial component of his image. A state that is not only unfavorable, but threatening as well, will likely be perceived much differently than one which is simply regarded as unfavorable. It is, therefore, feasible that a decision-maker will have different ways of judging the same types of actions performed by threatening states than those of non-threatening states. This is an extremely important component of image, the ramifications of which cannot be ignored.

Related to this is the apparent distinction which Dulles made between super-powers, and middle or small powers. In situations in which both types of states played a role, the image of the super-power was the dominant one. In Dulles' world, the image of the lesser state was over-shadowed by the dominant state.

A third, and again extremely important dichotomy can be made between moral issues and practical issues. While Dulles could be extremely fair and objective on the practical

level, if a moral element was introduced into a situation, the question of morality over-rode the practical considerations. It is important to realize that, for Dulles, any issue involving the Soviet Union immediately became a moral issue; any conflict involving the Soviet Union became a moral conflict. And when the moral element was introduced into a situation, Dulles' objectivity began to fade.

In sum, Dulles was faced with a super-power on the world stage, which was not only threatening, but morally offensive to him. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Soviet Union so dominated his world view. Hence, we find other states being relegated to positions of relative insignificance. This fact is even more firmly substantiated when we realize that, of the grand total of five-hundred and twenty evaluative statements retrieved from the press conferences, ninety-two percent of these related to the Soviet Union, five percent to Egypt, three percent to Great Britain, and, of course, no percentage at all to Hungary.

Having employed the evaluative assertion analysis of John Foster Dulles' press conferences, we have reached the conclusion that the Secretary of State warrants closer scrutiny than he has been given in the past. The findings of this study certainly do not substantiate the widespread belief that he was, "as near to being a man of black-and-white convictions as a rational mind could justify."[9]

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[9]See page 53 of this work.

Clearly, the man was a great deal more complex than has been assumed historically.

Summary

In writing this paper, we have joined the ranks of those interested in exploring the genesis, content, and implications of national images. We began by recognizing that, "it is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior."[10] The behavior of foreign policy decision-makers can have very far-reaching effects; it is therefore vital that we understand the way in which they view the world. An important part of one's world view is one's perceptions of other nations. This perception, -- this "national image", -- is the concept which we set out to explore. In the first chapter, then, we introduced and outlined the relationship between perception, national images, and behavior.

A survey of the broad range of literature dealing with national images was presented in the second chapter. The literature was found to encompass everything from stereotypes and prejudices to specific image studies. While a considerable amount of work has been done to determine the images held of other states by the public at large, relatively little attention has been paid to the actual images

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[10]Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 423.

held by foreign policy decision-makers. Research conducted by Garrett, Singer, Brecher, Burgess, and of course, Holsti, are notable exceptions. It was found that many disciplines have contributed to the study of national images, and varying approaches have been utilized.

The social-psychological phenomenon of perception, specifically as it relates to national images and image formation, was dealt with in chapter three. It is essential to understand something of this process if one is to fully recognize the importance and relevance of one's perceptions and images to one's actions. Perception itself involves the interpretation of messages from the environment into information which has meaning for the individual. This process of interpretation was dealt with in the chapter. It was noted that while a national image is a conglomerate of perceptions, the image itself tends to be oversimplified. In addition, the closely related subjects of judgment and rigidity were discussed.

Chapter four was composed of much information pertinent to the case study. Initially, a short description of Dulles himself was presented, along with reasons for his selection as a subject. The topics of available sources and content analysis were subsequently discussed, in order to provide a broader perspective from which to view the case study. Lastly, the materials and method utilized in the study were outlined.

The results of the evaluative assertion analysis were related in chapter five. This method revealed that John Foster Dulles was indeed a more complex individual than he has generally been given credit for. The results also pointed to three dichotomies in Dulles' thinking, -- any or all of which may be relevant to the national images of all foreign policy decision-makers. These dichotomies were between the perception of threatening and non-threatening states, between super-powers and middle and small powers, and between moral and practical considerations. In addition to these findings, some comments regarding the method itself were made.

General Conclusions

The subject of national images is one of great significance to international analysis. In combination with the study of other salient factors of a decision-maker's personality, national image content may provide a valuable link between thought and action in the international arena. We emphasize once again that it is the perception, not the reality, of one's environment upon which the individual bases his actions. The perceptions, the images held by a foreign policy decision-maker of the states with which he interacts are of vital importance. Perception itself is a psychological process. In order to effectively study decision-making, political scientists must familiarize themselves with psychological processes to a much greater

degree than they have done in the past. Only by gaining an insight into the world in which a decision-maker sees himself to be operating can we truly understand why he behaves the way he does. One important part of his world is the way in which he perceives other nations.

In researching this paper, it was hoped that a method through which national images could be ascertained could be outlined and demonstrated. This we have done. Building particularly on the work previously done by Ole Holsti, we have shown the evaluative assertion analysis of press conferences to have much potential for future research. As with much of the psychology of decision-making, the study of national image is in an emergent state. This study is nevertheless one of consequence for individuals concerned with achieving a true understanding of international interactions.

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APPENDIX

It was pointed out in chapter four that two types of resources, -- primary and secondary -- may be consulted in the search for information dealing with the individual decision-maker. It is essential that the student be aware of the sources available to him in order to carry out his research effectively. In the course of this study, extensive library research was undertaken, and a comprehensive bibliography of materials about John Foster Dulles was compiled. We believe that it will prove useful to present here the information which was obtained in the course of this research. Therefore, in this section, we will begin by discussing the resources which are generally available on any decision-maker, and follow with an examination of the types of sources which were consulted in our search for materials on Dulles himself.[1] Lastly, we will provide a bibliography of written materials about John Foster Dulles to which the various sources referred us. Due to the vast quantities of Dulles' personal documents that are available, references to such materials have not been included. We have, however, included information about the ways in which these types of references may be obtained.

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[1]Throughout this section, we will use the term "resources" to designate the actual materials containing information by or about the decision-maker. The term "sources" will refer to the index or other information system which led us to these materials.

Secondary sources, -- those materials written about the decision-maker, -- include books, magazine or newspaper articles, editorials, or any other types of materials in which the decision-maker is discussed. Personal biographies are a rich source of information, and may be historical or psychological in approach. Books dealing with certain policies, decisions, or incidents in which the individual played a key role may be available. There also exists a body of literature in which the individual is included, although the material may not be specifically about him.

Articles available in periodical magazines may be useful. While we might expect articles of a better quality to appear in Orbis or Daedalus, it is possible that important information may be found in an interview for Cosmopolitan or Playboy. The author and content of any article should be considered and evaluated by the researcher in selecting articles for research purposes. Simply because an article appears in a well-known scholarly journal is no guarantee that it will prove useful to the researcher; one found in Reader's Digest may be far more pertinent.

Another category of periodicals is the news-magazine. While generally these magazines do not tell us much that we cannot glean from other sources, they may occasionally be of value.

Newspapers can be helpful insofar as they may provide the student with editorial comment and some degree

of analysis. They may also provide the text of speeches made by the decision-maker, although these can be acquired more readily through primary source materials. A major drawback to using newspapers as a research source is that very few of them are indexed. Therefore, the researcher is required to pore over columns of newsprint in order to gain any information, -- an extremely time-consuming task. Secondary sources can be extremely valuable in providing the student with a great deal of information, and they are the logical place to begin any research project. They may provide a better perspective and a clearer portrayal of events than do the primary sources. However, if a true insight is to be gained into the beliefs of the individual, primary sources must be consulted. The merits and shortcomings of primary documents have been discussed in chapter four, however, we will proceed to explain the types of such sources which are available to the student.

Autobiographies are a rich source of information about the individual. They are, by definition, subjective materials, and must be studied carefully if they are to be of use to the researcher. The decision-maker may also have written works dealing specifically with his policies, or with the political environment in which he operated. Often articles written for periodicals are available. If articles or books which are political in nature were written before the individual attained office, they may tell us more about his attitudes and beliefs than those written after he entered

politics, and became subject to the various constraints of office.

A sizeable body of literature including the decision-maker's speeches, statements, addresses, and other such materials will also be available. While some of these materials may appear in journals, newspapers, or books, a more reliable source is the Government Documents section of a good library. The government of which the decision-maker was a part may itself provide access to some of this material. Archives preserving these sorts of materials are excellent when available.

Other sources possibly available are printed versions of television and radio interviews, or transcripts of televised debates. Materials which would prove helpful, but may be harder to find, are personal letters, diaries, or journals. Conversations with friends and relatives, be they remembered or recorded, may also shed some light on the character of the decision-maker.

Following this preliminary discussion of the materials available on the decision-maker, we turn to an overview of the sources which have directed us to materials dealing specifically with Dulles. These sources, however, are of value to the student undertaking to research any decision-maker. While most of the sources to be discussed are available in the libraries at the University of Alberta, some outside sources have been investigated.

The first source consulted was, as might be expected, the comprehensive card catalogue in the Rutherford Library at the University of Alberta. The catalogue directed us to several books both by and about Dulles. While not providing an exhaustive listing, this source did inform us of the books available at this University. Next consulted were various periodical indexes, which covered a wide range of periodicals. The indexes consulted were as follows:

A. Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI)

B. Social Sciences and Humanities Index (SSHI)

C. Canadian Periodical Index

D. Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature

E. Essay and General Literature Index (EGLI)

F. World Bibliography of Bibliographies

G. Bibliography of Bibliographies in Political Science

H. International Political Science Abstracts

I. International Index of the Social Sciences -- Political Science

J. Bibliographic Index

These indexes ranged from the very helpful to those which provided us with no information on our topic. Two of those which had numerous citations about Dulles were the Social Sicences Citation Index and the Social Sciences and Humanities Index (preceded by the International Index to Periodicals until 1964). The articles cited were generally of a high calibre, often written by well-respected authors

in "scholarly" journals. The Canadian Periodical Index contained references to reputable Canadian magazines, which were not to be found in either of the above-mentioned indexes. International Political Science Abstracts contained fewer listings than either the SSCI or the SSHI, but did list several of those cited by the other indexes. The International Index of the Social Sciences -- Political Science and the Bibliographic Index cited some articles, but these were already covered by the previously consulted sources, and these indexes contained fewer citations than did the others. The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature cited numerous reviews of various books written about Dulles, but also listed five articles which had not previously been cited. This is due to the fact that different periodicals are indexed in this source, among them American Heritage and Reader's Digest. The Reader's Guide also provided citations to several newsmagazines, however, these citations did not appear to be of much value to the present study. The Essay and General Literature Index contained numerous citations for primary sources, including speeches and addresses by the Secretary of State. The EGLI also contained citations of a type not to be found in the other indexes, in that it provided references to books in which chapters or essays had been devoted to Dulles. It seems unfortunate that few other indexes provide this type of information. The Bibliography of Bibliographies in Political Science is indexed in yet a different manner. Like the others it lists periodicals, and

by this stage we had noted all but one. However, this bibliography, consisting of several volumes dealing with various aspects of Political Science, contains extensive listings of books making reference to Dulles in a larger context. For example, books written about the Eisenhower era or the Cold War which contain material about Dulles are indexed in this Bibliography. The World Bibliography of Bibliographies contained no citations on John Foster Dulles.

The Library of Congress Catalogue of Books by Subject had also been consulted. Besides listing those books held in the Rutherford Library, the catalogue cited several other books about Dulles which are held by the Library of Congress, and which are available through the inter-library loan system. If one's research should require newspaper materials, both the London Times and the New York Times are indexed in Rutherford Library.

There also exists a category of sources which we can refer to as "systems". Included under this heading are DATRIX[2] and USPSIS[3]. DATRIX is a computer system which had access to almost one-half million doctoral dissertations

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[2]DATRIX can be contacted by writing to:
Datrix II Search Service,
Zerox University Microfilms,
300 North Zeeb Road,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[3]USPSIS can be reached by writing to:
Tom McKechnie,
USPSIS (United States Political Science Information System)
University Centre for International Studies,
University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15260.

from both Canadian and American Universities. For a reasonable fee[4], DATRIX will mail the student a complete listing of dissertations pertaining to the topic of his study. USPSIS (the United States Political Science Information System) is another computer system. It is keyed to one-hundred-and-fifty political science journals, and will provide the researcher with all articles dealing with the subject of his inquiry.[5]

We have previously noted that some of Dulles' personal documents are indexed in the Rutherford Library. The Card Catalogue, the Essay and General Literature Index and the National Union Catalogue (indexed by author) provides a great deal of material in the form of books, articles, and statements by Dulles himself. While some of these materials are available in the Cameron Library at this University, by far the richest source of primary materials is to be found at Princeton University, where the John Foster Dulles papers are held. More will be said of this collection in the following section.

At this point, we will present those materials which have been cited in the various sources available at the University of Alberta. The Rutherford Library Card Catalogue and the Library of Congress Catalogue of Books by

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[4]Datrix charges $15.00 for a printout of up to 150 references; extra citations will be sent for 10¢ each, with a $5.00 prepaid charge.

[5]USPSIS charges a flat rate of $15.00 for the complete listing.

Subject provided us with the following references to materials about Dulles. Those marked with an asterisk are to be found at the University of Alberta; the others are available at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.

*Beal, John Robinson. John Foster Dulles. New York: Harper and Bros., 1959.

Berding, Andrew Henry Thomas. Dulles on Diplomacy. New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1965.

*Drummond, Roscoe, and Coblentz, Gaston. Duel at the Brink. New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963.

*Dulles, Eleanor Lansing. John Foster Dulles: The Last Year. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1963.

*Finer, Herman. Dulles Over Suez. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1964.

Gerson, L.L. John Foster Dulles (vol. 17 of The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.) New York: Cooper, 1967.

*Goold-Adams, Richard. The Time of Power -- A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962.

*Guhin, Michael A. John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

Heller, Deane F. and Heller, David. John Foster Dulles, Soldier for Peace. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960.

*Holsti, Ole R. "The Belief System and National Images: John Foster Dulles and the Soviet Union." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, Calif., 1962.

*Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973.

Stang, Alan. The Actor; the True Story of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State 1953-1959. Boston: Western Islands, 1968.

Wagner, Francis S., ed. The Hungarian Revolution in Perspective. Washington: F.F. Memorial Foundation, 1967.

We have also obtained references to books which contain essays or chapters dealing with Dulles, which were located primarily through the Essay and General Literature Index. These are as follows.

Brown, J.M. "Crusade in Washington", in Brown, J.M. Through These Men. New York: Harper, 1956.

Craig, G.A. "John Foster Dulles and American Statecraft", in Craig, G.S. War, Politics, and Diplomacy. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Curtis, G.L. "The Dulles-Yoshida Negotiations on the San Francisco Peace Treaty", in Columbia Essays in International Affairs: The Deans Papers, 1966.

Findlay, David J., Holsti, Ole R. and Fagen, Richard R. Enemies in Politics. Chapter Two: "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia". Chicago: Rand, McNally and Co., 1967.

Morgenthau, H.G. "John Foster Dulles", in Graebner, N.A., ed. An Uncertain Tradition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.

Nitze, P.H. "A Shaky Balance of Brinksmanship", in Duchacek, I. Conflict and Cooperation Among Nations. New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1960.

Nixon, R.M. "An Appreciation of John Foster Dulles", in Life - Great Reading from Life. New York: Harper, 1960.

Parmet, H.S. "Power and Reality: John Foster Dulles and Political Diplomacy", in Merli, F.J. and Wilson, T.A., eds. Makers of American Diplomacy. New York: Scribner, 1974.

Rusk, D. "Toasts and Tributes: To John Foster Dulles", in Rusk, D. The Winds of Freedom. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.

The following collection of articles were obtained through the various indexes which were discussed in the previous section.

Cohen, M.A. "Changing Mood in Washington: from Dulles to Herter". Saturday Night, 74 (June 6, 1959), 12-13.

Cottrell, A.J. "Eisenhower Era in Asia". Current History, 57 (August, 1969), 84-87.

Falls, C. "Two Giants Leave at a Critical Time". Illustrated London News, 234 (April 25, 1959), 696.

Fenton, J. and Challener, R.D. "Which Way America? Dulles Always Knew". American Heritage, 22 (June, 1971), 12-13.

Fraser, R.B. "Life with Dulles: True or False?". Macleans, 69 (March 3, 1956), 5, 49.

Fraser, R.B. "What Happens When Dulles Goes?". Macleans, 72 (January 17, 1959), 13-15, 51-52.

Friedman, Edward, "Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War". Modern China, 1 (Spring, 1975), 75-91.

Gerson, L.L. "John Foster Dulles: The Last Two Years". Modern Age 12 (Summer, 1968), 272-280.

Gilmour, I. "Eden, Dulles and Collusion". Spectator, 204 (February 5, 1960), 167-168.

Guhin, M.A. "Dulles Thoughts on International Politics: Myth and Reality". Orbis, 13 (Fall, 1969), 865-889.

Holsti, Ole. "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs". Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (March, 1970), 123-157.

Hoopes, T. "God and John Foster Dulles". Foreign Policy, 13 (Winter, 1973), 154-177.

Jefferson, L. "Conversation with Dulles". National Review, 19 (June 27, 1967), 681-682.

Just, W. "My Love Affair with Foster". Atlantic, 238 (September, 1976), 66-67.

Lindley, E.K. "Washington Memo". Macleans, 72 (January 17, 1959), 13-15, 51-52.

McInnis, E.W. "Two Years of Mr. Dulles". Canadian Business, 28 (February, 1955), 38-40.

Nimer, B. "Dulles, Suez and Democratic Diplomacy". Western Political Quarterly, 12 (September, 1959), 784-798.

Nixon, R.M. "Unforgettable John Foster Dulles". Reader's Digest, 91 (July, 1967), 99-104.

Rovere, R.H. "Ike Without the Prince". Spectator, 202 (February 20, 1959), 248.

Rovere, R.H. "Obituary". Spectator, 202 (May 29, 1959), 752.

Rovere, R.H. "Which Dulles?". Spectator, 196 (January 27, 1956), 102-103.

Silcox, C.E. "Dulles and Herter". Canadian Commentator, 3 (May, 1959), 4-5.

Stassen, G.H. "Individual Preference versus Role Constraint in Policy-Making; Senatorial Response to Secretaries Acheson and Dulles". World Politics, 25 (October, 1972), 96-119.

Thomas, I.B. "Unfair to Foster Dulles?". Twentieth Century, 177-78 (1969), 39-40.

Thompson, Dean K. "World Community Epitomized: Henry Pitney Van Dusen on John Foster Dulles and Dag Hammarskjold". Journal of Presbyterian History, 48 (1970), 293-315.

Wilson, Evan M. "The American Interest in the Palestine Question and the Establishment of Israel". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 401 (1972), 64-73.*

Woodside, C.W., "From Acheson to Dulles, Free World has New Foreign Policy Leader". Saturday Night, 68 (December 6, 1952), 16-17.

Wright, E. "Foreign Policy Since Dulles". Political Quarterly, 33 (April, 1962), 114-128.

"End of the Dulles Epoch". Economist, 191 (April, 18, 1959), 205-206.

"Positive Measures for Peace". Ecumenical Review, 8 (July, 1956), 387-389.

"Late John Foster Dulles". External Affairs, 11 (June, 1959), 120.

"Japan and the Phillipines". Far East, 20 (June 13, 1951), 115.

Arab-Israeli Affairs-Statement". Middle East, 6 (August, 1955), 270-273.

"Mr. Dulles Replies to Russell and Kruschev". New Statesman, 55 (February 8, 1958), 158.

"Treaty of Reconciliation and Liberation". State Government, 24 (November, 1951), 269-272.

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*The month of the issue was not provided in index from which the reference was obtained, and could not be ascertained through other sources.

Those articles appearing in newsmagazines have not been included here, as they did not appear to be of as much value as the articles listed above. However, should the researcher be interested, many articles and pictorials are available in various newsmagazines which are indexed in the library. Newspapers have not been examined either; as previously mentioned we do have access to the indexed London Times and New York Times.

As indicated earlier, citations to Dulles' personal documents will not be included here. However, the Dulles papers in Princeton contain the complete collection of the Secretary of State's writings and speeches. The following materials are available at Princeton:

> ...articles, speeches, statements, interviews, correspondence, clippings, photographs, etc. which together occupy about 550 boxes.[6]

The Dulles papers,

> ...range over his entire public career beginning with the Hague Conference of 1907 and include materials relating to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1919; the Reparations Commission, 1919; the German Debt Conferences of 1933-1934; the San Francisco Conference on World Organization, 1945; the United Nations General Assembly, 1946-1948, 1950; the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945, 1947, 1949; his term as an Interim United States Senator and his campaign for election to the Senate, 1949; the Japanese Peace Treaty, 1951, etc. The papers at the Princeton University Library which refer to Mr. Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State, 1953-1959, do not include the "official" files of that office

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[6]Letter from Nancy Bressler of the Seely G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, March 30, 1977.

which are under the regulations of the Department of State.[7]

We have no indication that any personal diaries or journals are available.

Dulles himself wrote two books, both of which are held in Rutherford Library. These are War, Peace and Change (New York: Harper and Bros.,) written in 1939, and War or Peace (New York: Macmillan and Co.) written in 1950. Much primary material is also to be found in the following books, which are available at the University of Alberta.

TV Documents of Our Time. London: Associated Television, 1959.

Van Dusen, Henry P., ed. The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960.

The Vital Letters of Russell, Kruschev, Dulles. London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1958.

It often proves difficult for the student conducting research on a decision-maker to know where to begin in his search for resources. Indeed, this search may well be the single most important step in a project of this nature. The preceding information has been included in order to aid the student in familiarizing himself with the sources and resources available to him. For the individual interested in John Foster Dulles himself, the bibliography presented here will be useful in directing him to relevant materials.

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[7]Ibid.